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ABSTRACT 
 
 Ownership may not always be the best driver for investment incentives in an incomplete contract 
context. This paper shows that ownership has two facets (access and veto) which can be used 
specifically, and sometimes independently, to foster investment. Access is more efficient than 
ownership when assets are complements at the margin, and veto is sometimes more efficient 
when assets are substitutes at the margin. In particular, outside veto is more efficient than 
ownership because it reduces the incentive to invest on substitute assets. And joint veto is more 
efficient than ownership because it protects the incentives of highly productive agents while 
preventing them to merge the asset with substitute assets.  
We discuss several implications, in particular the existence of shareholders and non-owner 
workers, the optimality of outside ownership, joint ownership and partnerships, hybrid 
governance structures, employments contracts and capital structure (debt vs equity). 
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 1. Introduction 
 
1.1. General introduction 
A proper existence and distribution of property rights can eliminate 
the sources of high transaction costs (Alchian, 1961, Demsetz, 1967, Alchian 
and Demsetz, 1973). In their seminal papers, Grossman and Hart (1986, GH) 
and Hart and Moore (1990, H&M)1, hereafter GHM, have formalized the 
concept and modeled asset ownership as a substitute for contract 
incompleteness. In their framework ownership is viewed as providing 
‘residual rights of control’ and more specifically the ‘ability to exclude others 
from the use of the asset’ (H&M). When contracts are incomplete, control 
over an asset gives ex-post bargaining power, hence increases ex-ante 
incentives to invest. Thus ownership provides incentives. But why should 
asset ownership be so central to the production activity? After all, most 
productive agents in the economy do not own assets and most asset owners 
(e.g. shareholders) do not produce.  
Recent critiques to the GHM’s property rights theory have 
highlighted its limits. It does not incorporate the Berle and Means perspective 
of separation between ownership and control (Bolton and Sharfstein, 1998), 
the notion of ownership is somehow rigid and besides ‘no control’ and ‘full 
control’ there are other cases of intermediate control or ownership (Hart, 
1995)2, ‘residual control rights’ is an ambiguous concept and may not be 
equivalent to ownership (Demsetz, 1998), assets are multi-attributes, each of 
which may have different ownership (Foss and Foss, 2001), investment 
incentives are not provided by ownership alone (Holmstrom and Roberts, 
1998), in particular access can be an alternative (potentially complementary) 
way of providing incentives (Rajan and Zingales, 1998, RZ), the theory does 
not explain why assets are clustered in firms and why firms own assets rather 
than individuals (Holmstrom, 1999). 
                                                 
1 GH emphasizes the costs and benefits of ownership and control and their role in determining 
the size of the firm. H&M generalizes the concept to I agents and N assets and find 
conditions on agents and assets for an optimal integration. 
2 Hart (1995) mentions a subsidiary, renting or leasing of assets, or franchising as examples. 
He also notes that ‘the literature has by and large not used the property rights approach to 
analyze intermediate forms of ownership but this is an interesting topic for future research’. 
This paper is an attempt in that direction. 
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In this paper, we propose to answer these critiques and broaden the 
H&M framework by incorporating the view of many scholars (e.g. Schlager 
and Ostrom, 1992) who have defined ownership as a bundle of rights, 
including the right to use or access the asset (emphasized by RZ) and the 
right to exclude others from its use (emphasized by GHM). We take these 
two rights as primitives and define ownership as the right to use (we call it 
access) an asset and the right to exclude (we call it veto) others from using it. 
Integrating RZ’s intuition that access provides power, we define control over 
an asset as: access, provided that no one else has veto. In this conception 
(compatible with both H&M and RZ’s intuitions), access gives control and 
veto removes control from the other agents. We clarify here the costs and 
benefits of ownership and control (emphasized by GH) which determine the 
size of the firm. Benefits (increase of incentives) are provided by access, 
while costs (decrease of incentives for the other agents) are generated by veto.  
In H&M assets are always complementary at the margin (they 
increase the marginal return of the agent(s) who control them together). But 
more assets may actually generate decreasing returns to the management or 
entrepreneur function (Coase, 1937). Thus in our framework, we relax the 
H&M assumption and allow assets to be sometimes substitutes at the margin. 
Taking access and veto rights as primitives in the definition of 
ownership and control, and relaxing the assumption on asset complementarity 
(at the margin) gives rise to a broader framework3. We find a justification for 
the role of shareholders (who have veto but not access) and 
workers/managers (who have access but not veto). Our model has 
implications for the boundaries of the firm and besides the owner-managed 
firms studied by H&M, we find optimality conditions for the existence of 
outside ownership (outside veto), hybrid governance structures such as 
franchising or licensing (multiple access on the same asset), partnerships 
(multiple access and joint veto on one same asset), or joint ownership (joint 
access and joint veto on assets). 
To understand the different roles that access and veto can play here is 
a simple intuition. When assets are complementary at the margin and an 
agent gives access to her asset to a second agent, it increases incentives of the 
second agent (without decreasing the incentives of the first) but it also 
                                                 
3 The H&M framework becomes a special case where assets are all complementary at the 
margin and access and veto must be allocated together.  
increases incentives of the other ‘external’ agents because the agent who is 
given access will bring the complementary asset with him in their 
relationships. On the other hand, when assets are substitutes at the margin and 
an agent gives veto on her asset to a second agent, it increases incentives of 
the agent who has given veto and of all the other ‘external’ agents, because 
the agent who has given veto will not bring the substitute asset with her in 
their relationships. The separate allocation of access and veto provides a 
richer set of contracts and incentive mechanisms than ownership alone. We 
now take a simple (stylized) example to motivate our paper.  
 
1.2. An example 
In most cities, a taxi company can only operate with a license. Licenses are 
sold by the city which regulates the number of taxis in circulation. The owner 
of a license can operate a taxi company herself or lease the license to an 
operator who buys several cars, and leases the cars to taxi drivers. The taxi 
drivers typically pay a fixed fee to the taxi company and get the residual 
income (after paying for the petrol). So why is it that, against the prediction 
of the property right theory, the main agent that should be given incentives 
(the taxi driver) is the one that does not own anything?  
A (partial) answer has already been given by RZ who have identified 
some conditions under which ownership may reduce incentives and shown 
that regulated access can be an alternative to ownership to foster incentives. 
But their framework is different from H&M. They assume that there is 
always an owner (the entrepreneur) and look at the optimal number of agents 
(the managers) who should have access, rather than to whether access should 
be given at all; their focus is the regulation rather than the allocation of 
access. In our view, the number of managers who should access/operate the 
asset is generally set by other criteria (for example only two drivers 
maximum can operate a taxicab) and the real question is which level of rights 
on the asset they should have in order to maximize their and others’ 
incentives. RZ consider the firm as only one asset and study the effect of 
complementary and substitute investments, while we view the firm as a 
collection of assets which can be complementary or substitutes. While they 
focus on comparing ownership to access, we analyze the notions of 
ownership, access and veto. Overall, RZ’s framework focuses on the 
optimization of internal organization rather than the external boundaries of 
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the firm. But we join RZ in their main intuition that access may foster 
investment incentives. 
Consider a city with three agents. Peter owns a cab, Lucy owns a call 
center and Joe is a driver with no cab. Suppose there is a second cab, who 
should own it? The two cabs and the call center are all complementary so that 
combining them always produce a higher return, for a given level of 
investment, than using them separately (i.e. two cabs combined produce a 
higher value since fixed costs – garage, book-keeping – can be shared, and 
the call center increase the value produced by a cab but has no value in itself). 
Joe, Peter and Lucy are also complementary and they will work together and 
bargain to share the revenue produced. Suppose they each are considering 
making a specific investment in human capital at cost 100 to each of them: 
they will learn the city4 (the streets, the shortcuts, the ‘red’ points with traffic 
jams,…) to increase their productivity as a taxi driver (for Joe and Peter) and 
as a call center manager (for Lucy). If Joe shares a taxicab with Peter (they 
each drive separate shifts), the additional revenue he can generate is 360. But 
if both Joe and Peter have a cab, the additional revenue produced by Joe is 
240. This is because when Joe and Peter each drives a cab, they have to 
monitor the calls (i.e. allocate customers between them) and coordinate their 
routes (to cover the city efficiently). This takes time out of the productive 
chargeable time and imposes routes in such a way that it partially offsets the 
additional productivity of Joe. Two cabs decrease the marginal return on 
Joe’s investment (we will say that the two cabs are substitutes at the margin) 
and the difference 360-240 represents the substitution effect ( SE , the impact 
of substitution on the marginal return). If Joe owns the cab, he will bargain 
with Peter (we suppose they use the Nash Bargaining solution) to share the 
additional revenue and will get 1/ 2(240 )P P+ −  or 
1/ 2( ) 1/ 2(240)P + where P is the outside option of Joe with his cab in case 
the negotiation breaks down. In this case P  represents the marginal 
productivity of Joe alone with his cab. If Joe does not own the cab, he will get 
1/ 2(360) after bargaining with Peter (we suppose that the outside option of 
Joe without cab is w  which will normalize to zero). So it is better for Joe to 
                                                 
4 Even if this example is highly stylized, it is of some relevance as a survey conducted in 
March 1998 by the NSW Transport Department showed that the performance of taxi drivers in 
the region of Sydney lagged with respect to driver’s knowledge of locations and English 
proficiency. 
own the cab if 1/ 2( ) 1/ 2(240) 1/ 2(360)P + >  i.e. if 360 240P SE> − = . 
But if the marginal productivity of Joe with the cab alone is lower than the 
substitution effect ( P SE< ), it is better for Joe not to own the cab. In that 
case ownership may actually reduce Joe’s incentive to invest. Someone else 
should have the right to veto Joe from using the cab. So, should Lucy own it 
(if Peter owns it, it will decrease his own incentive to invest)? If Lucy invests 
in developing her own knowledge of the city, she can increase her benefit 
from the call center by 360. But if she also drives a cab, she can only increase 
her benefit by 240 (she will have to coordinate with Peter and it will partially 
offset her additional productivity). This is because adding a second cab 
decreases the marginal benefit produced with a cab and the call center (the 
call center is substitute at the margin with a cab in presence of another cab). 
If Lucy can drive the cab, she will do it (a cab and the call center are 
complementary), and after bargaining with Peter she will get a marginal 
benefit of 21/ 2( ) 1/ 2(240)P + where 2P  is her outside option with the two 
assets (her marginal productivity alone with the cab and the call center). If 
she cannot drive the cab, after bargaining with Peter she will get a marginal 
benefit of 11/ 2( ) 1/ 2(360)P +  (where 1P  is her outside option alone with 
the call center). So it may better for Lucy not to have access to the cab if 
1 21/ 2( ) 1/ 2(360) 1/ 2( ) 1/ 2(240)P P+ > + , i.e. if 2 1 120P P− <  (despite 
the fact that the cab and the call center are complementary). If ownership 
includes both the rights to veto and to access the cab, then Lucy should not 
own the cab: ownership (by either Joe or Lucy) is not a proper solution to 
induce both Joe and Lucy to invest. Rather, the solution is for Lucy to have 
veto on Joe’s cab but not to have access to it. Outside veto by Lucy is good 
because it ‘ties the hands’ of Joe and protects him from merging his taxicab 
with another one which is substitute at the margin. But access by Lucy may 
prompt her to merge two complementary assets (the call center and Peter’s 
cab) which may become substitutes (at the margin) in presence of a third one. 
Lucy should have veto but not access on Joe’s cab. De-bundling ownership 
into access and veto gives rise to a larger set of contracts that allow 
maximizing the agents’ incentives. We find multiple examples in real life: 
shareholders have veto on the firm’s assets (it prevents managers to merge 
substitute assets) but do not access them, an employer has veto on the 
employee’s human capital (it helps the employee to specialize on her job) but 
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the employee keeps the right to use his human capital (human capital is 
unalienable), a manager has veto power on the worker’s task,…  
Our model stays close to H&M, follows the idea that ownership is a bundle 
of rights (Demsetz, 1967, Schlager and Ostrom, 1992) and incorporates the 
notion of access highlighted by RZ. The idea that a larger scope of the firm 
(more assets) may actually lead to decreasing returns in the management 
function (i.e. assets may be substitutes at the margin) comes from Coase 
(1937) and is explored in the work of many scholars, e.g. Williamson (1967), 
Rotemberg and Salomer (1994). The insight that outside ownership can be 
good has been highlighted by RZ and by Segal and Whinston (2000) who in 
both cases mention the positive impact of outside ownership by a non-
investing party in case of substitute investments. We extend this notion to 
investing parties, in case of substitute assets at the margin and show that 
outside veto is good only if the marginal productivity of the agent who gives 
veto is lower than the substitution effect. The impact of property rights on the 
type of integration (inclusion, exclusion, collusion) is derived from Segal 
(2003). Where Segal shows that each type of integration is the best response 
to a particular form of relationship between the agents, we show that 
allocating access, veto or ownership is the best response to particular forms 
of asset relationships. But we consider the impact of an allocation of rights on 
the ex-ante incentives of all agents and thus on welfare, while Segal uses a 
zero-sum game where the gains of one coalition impose a negative externality 
on the complementary coalition (i.e. a coalition will ‘gain’ if the 
complementary coalition ‘looses’). His framework then applies to situations 
where a given coalition has ‘an institutional advantage in prior contracting’5 
while we consider the case where agents and coalitions have equal 
opportunities to contract. With this focus6, the results of Segal are different 
and sometimes opposed to ours. 
Overall, the model is highly stylized. It is restricted to a static 
environment and ignores the effect of repeated interactions (Halonen, 2002) 
and the power of relational contracts (Baker et al., 2002, Levin and Rayo, 
2003). It omits the impact of financial constraints (Dewatripont and Tirole, 
1994) or the potential role of authority (Aghion and Tirole, 1997). The 
                                                 
5 Segal gives this example: ‘if members of this coalition can meet before other players arrive at 
the scene’. 
6 On the other hand Segal uses a broader solution concept (random-order value) while we stick 
to the Shapley value used in H&M. 
bargaining game does not account for non linear outside options (De Meza 
and Lockwood, 1998) or the costs of bargaining (Milgrom and Roberts, 
1990). By focusing on allocation of property rights, the framework also 
ignores other incentive instruments (Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1994). Our 
main purpose here is to propose a more elaborate view of ownership and 
describe its impact for the provision of ex-ante incentives. Relaxing some 
assumptions of the H&M framework, we are thus testing (and we hope 
proving) that the model can be extended far beyond the vertical integration of 
physical assets to deal with more general applications.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 
introduces the model and the main concepts. Section 3 studies the optimal 
control structure and presents the main results. Section 4 discusses some 
applications and the consequences for the boundaries of the firm. The 
conclusion discusses the implications, points out some limitations and 
suggests directions for future research.  
 
2. The model 
 
We follow H&M (1990). We consider an economy with a set { }1,...,N n=  
of risk-neutral agents and a set { }1,..., KA a a=  of assets. Rights over assets 
are allocated at date 0 and agents invest. At date 1, production takes place and 
the surplus is shared between the agents through an ex-post efficient 
bargaining process, using the Shapley value as the solution concept7. No 
variable, besides the allocation of rights, is contractible, but the control 
structure (determined by the allocation of rights) agreed upon by the agents 
ex ante can be enforced8. We also assume that side payments between agents 
are allowed, so that efficient trading at date 0 leads to a control structure that 
maximizes the overall surplus at date 1. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
7 We use the Shapley value to stick to the H&M framework, but our results would generalize 
to any fixed probabilistic distribution of the value among the agents. 
8 In particular we rule out secret asset transfer by the agents and we assume that access at date 
1 can be enforced (as in RZ). 
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2.1. Access, Veto and Control structures 
We define ownership as a bundle of two rights: the right to use or access the 
asset and the right to exclude or veto others from using the asset9. 
We represent a veto structure by a mapping χ  from the set of subsets of N  
to the set of subsets of A , where ( )Sχ  is the subset of assets that the 
coalition S  has veto rights on at date 1
10. χ  satisfies the following condition: 
( ') ( )S Sχ χ⊆  for any subset 'S  of S    (1.1) 
The assets vetoed by a subset 'S  of a coalition S will also be vetoed by the 
whole coalition and we assume that the grand coalition can veto all the assets 
( ( )N Aχ = ). 
Similarly, we represent an access structure by a mapping υ  from the set of 
subsets of N  to the set of subsets of A , where ( )Sυ  is the subset of assets 
that the coalition S can access at date 1. υ  satisfies the following condition: 
 ( ') ( )S Sυ υ⊆  for any subset 'S  of S      (1.2) 
The assets accessed by a subset 'S  of a coalition S will also be accessed by 
the whole coalition11, and we assume that the grand coalition can access all 
the assets ( ( )N Aυ = ). 
Note that there is somehow a ‘pecking order’ between access and veto, since 
an agent who has veto on an asset can prevent another agent to access it 
without her. 
                                                 
9 This is a convenient way to summarize more complete definitions of ownership. For example, 
Schlager and Ostrom (1992) identify five basic property rights: access, withdrawal, 
management, exclusion and alienation. We combine the first three into access and the last two 
into veto. 
10 This notion is similar to the notion of exclusivity provision studied by Segal and Whinston 
(2000). Like them, we find that allocating veto matters when the investments affect the ‘value 
of trade’ between the agent giving veto rights and an external party (see Proposition 3). 
11 This is different from RZ who implicitly assume that ( ') ( )S Sυ υ⊇ for any subset 'S of S . 
In fact in RZ, implicitly a coalition can access an asset if all of its members have access 
( ( ) ( )
i S
S iυ υ
∈
=I ) while we assume that it can access the asset if any of its members has access 
( ( ) ( )
i S
S iυ υ
∈
⊇U ).  
The allocation of access and veto rights chosen by the agents ex-ante will 
characterize a control structure which will determine their incentives to 
invest. We now define the notion of control structure. 
 
   DEFINITION. A control structure is a mapping β  from the set of subsets 
of N  to the set of subsets of A , such that ( ) ( ) \ ( \ )S S N Sβ υ χ= . 
         
The assets controlled by a coalition S  are the assets that the coalition can 
access and that are not vetoed by coalitions outside of S . This definition 
combines the role of veto12 and the role of access13. Both mechanisms are 
source of power and as such foster relationship-specific investment. But since 
we are interested in productive investments on the assets, control without 
access is worthless. Hence our definition. 
It is easy to see that ( )β ∅ =∅  and ( )N Aβ =  and that the assets 
controlled by a subset 'S  of a coalition S will also be controlled by the 
whole coalition: 
( ') ( )S Sβ β⊆  for any subset 'S  of S   (1.3)  
A control structure is a veto structure when ‘control’ is fully determined by 
veto (i.e. ( ) ( ),v S S S Nβ χ= ∀ ⊆ ) and is an access structure when ‘control’ 
is fully determined by access (i.e. ( ) ( ),a S S S Nβ υ= ∀ ⊆ ). 
   DEFINITION. A control structure is an ownership structure when ‘control’ 
is determined by both veto and access14 such that a coalition has access to an 
asset if and only if it can veto it (i.e. ( ) ( ) ( )o S S Sβ υ χ= = ).  
Ownership is different from veto. In our definition, ownership is not simply 
the right to exclude others from the use of the asset (veto), it also requires the 
right to access the asset. For example, signing an exclusive contract gives 
veto power to the party who is given exclusivity but does not give her 
ownership on the other party’s asset (she does not have access to it). 
In H&M the notion of ownership is defined through the concept of ‘residual 
control rights’. It is not very clear how this notion translates in terms of 
access and veto. On one hand they state that ‘the sole right possessed by the 
                                                 
12 Identified by H&M. 
13 Highlighted by RZ. 
14 Ownership is the bundle of access and veto rights. 
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owner of an asset is his ability to exclude others from the use of that asset’ 
(p.1121) which seems to identify ownership with veto. But on the other hand 
they mention that ‘an agent’s bargaining position will depend on which assets 
he has access to and hence will be sensitive to the allocation of ownership’ 
(p.1122) and that ‘transferring ownership of an asset to party 1 increases 1’s 
freedom of action to use the asset as he or she sees fit’ (p.1120). Thus, despite 
their first assertion, it seems that their notion of ownership somehow 
encompasses both the right to veto and the right to use the asset. We provide 
here a clear definition of ownership.  
Ownership is different from control. In our conception a coalition 
controls a group of assets if it can access it and no one else outside of the 
coalition can veto it. So ‘control’ is different from ownership which requires 
both access and control15. In their famous essay Berle and Means (1932) have 
highlighted that ownership is separated from control in modern corporations 
and control ultimately resides with managers rather than owners16. If residual 
control rights are the rights to decide how the asset is to be used except the 
particular usages specified by contract, then we can argue that access itself 
may confer some residual control rights. In particular the agent who accesses 
an asset may be in a position to capture some unspecified use rights over the 
asset. For example, there is usually no formal contract that specifies the use 
of a client list by a sales manager. If selling or giving away the list to a 
competitor is obviously not under her control, certain use rights such as 
which product to sell to each individual customer, or the number of lunches 
that the manager may take with the main customers, are likely to be 
unspecified and unenforceable by the ‘owner’. In these instances the manager 
exercises some de facto form of residual control rights over the use of the 
asset17.  
In our taxi example, the government (which can determine whether the 
taxicab can be operated outside the contingencies outlined in the license 
agreement, e.g. requisition in case of war), the owner of the license plate 
                                                 
15 But of course, when a coalition owns a set of assets, it controls it.  
16 Hart (1995) suggests that ‘the separation of ownership and effective control’ (we call the 
latter de facto control rights) may be a better description.  
17 And gets residual claim (e.g. perquisites, perks) to the asset profit stream. The difference 
between de jure and de facto residual rights of control is in the same vein as the difference 
between real and formal authority (Aghion and Tirole, 1997). 
 
(who may decide to renew or not the license, thereby somehow controlling 
the use of the car as a taxicab), the operator herself, who is the de jure owner 
of the taxicab (she may decide to whom and when leasing the taxicab or how 
to maintain it) and the taxi driver, who leases the cab (he may decide where 
to drive it or how carefully to drive it) all have some residual control rights. 
This simple example shows that it is difficult to assimilate ownership with 
residual control rights. ‘Residual control rights’ is an ambiguous concept 
(Demsetz, 1998). They do not always come with ownership, they can be 
rented (e.g. by the taxi driver) and the division of rights between the taxi 
driver (who has access rights) and the other parties (who have veto rights) 
seem more relevant to the analysis of the production activity than the division 
between residual and non residual rights. 
In H&M, control is somehow assimilated to ownership 18  and the results 
brought by their control structure are viewed as a theory of ownership. We 
use here a clear distinction between control and ownership.  
There is single access when a single agent can access an asset 
( ( ) ( )i jυ υ∩ =∅ ), multiple access when several agents can access it 
( ( ) ( )i jυ υ∩ ≠∅ ) and joint access when several agents can only access an 
asset jointly but not individually ( ( ) ( ) , ( , )i j i jυ υ υ= = ∅ ≠∅ ). Idem for 
veto and ownership. 
Examples of multiple access are licensing or franchising. In a licensing 
contract an agent (the licensor) gives the right to use (access) his asset (e.g. a 
technology) to another agent (the licensee). The licensor keeps residual 
control rights on the content of the technology while the licensee gets residual 
control rights on the marketing. Both agents have access to the technology: 
they have residual control rights on different attributes of the technology (the 
licensor has renounced to his veto right on a part of the technology, i.e. the 
marketing, for the duration of the contract). 
An example of multiple veto19 is a joint venture where each partner cannot 
control and derive revenue from the asset without the other partner (each 
                                                 
18 In the definition they mention that they ‘represent the ownership and control structure by a 
mapping…’ or in Proposition 8 state that ‘If two (or more) assets are (strictly) complementary, 
they should be owned or controlled together’. 
19 Multiple veto can be shown to be equivalent to multiple ownership and to joint ownership.   
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partner can veto the other one) 20 . An illustration of joint veto 21  is a 
partnership, when each individual partner cannot veto but the group of 
partners can. 
Finally, when a group of agents can veto an asset accessed by another group 
of agents it is called outside veto ( ( ) ( \ )S N Sυ χ∩ ≠ ∅ ). An illustration of 
outside veto is a publicly-held company, where a group of outside agents 
(shareholders) can veto the agents who access the asset. Although we prefer 
the term outside veto22 to characterize this structure as the shareholders do 
not typically have access to the asset, most of the literature refers to it as 
outside ownership23.  
 
2.2. Control structure and H&M control structure 
The following definition derives directly from H&M. 
   DEFINITION. A control structure β  is said to be an H&M control 
structure if ( ) ( \ )S N Sβ β∩ = ∅  for all S N⊆     
In H&M control (and ownership) is not dividable (two disjoint coalitions 
cannot control/own the same set of assets). This is in contradiction with the 
view that property rights are diverse and need not be owned by one single 
party (Demsetz, 1967, 1996), that assets may be viewed as a bundle of 
different attributes, each of which may have different ownership (Barzel, 
1982) and the fact that divided property rights are frequent in the real world: 
copyrights, patents,, security interests, partnerships, corporations (Hansmann 
and Kraakman, 2002). 
 
   PROPOSITION 1. A control structure is an H&M control structure if and 
only if ( ) ( \ ) ( ) ( \ )S N S S N Sυ υ χ χ∩ ⊆ ∪ , S N∀ ⊆  
 
                                                 
20 H&M (1990) show that multiple veto is not efficient in their framework (Proposition HM4). 
This is  because assets are complementary at the margin.   
21 There are several specific forms of joint veto. In particular all agents who access the asset 
may have joint veto (unanimity) or only a group of them through a voting mechanism 
(majority veto) or through a stochastic system (stochastic veto). We do not study these forms 
specifically as the results would be similar in our framework. 
22 Demsetz (1967) comments on this distinction and states that the managers are the de facto 
owners. 
23 May be because veto is assimilated to ownership. 
Proof. Take a control structure β  and a coalition S N⊆ . β  is an H&M 
control structure if and only if  ( ) ( \ )S N Sβ β∩ = ∅   
i.e. [ ( ) \ ( \ )] [ ( \ ) \ ( )]S N S N S Sυ χ υ χ∩ =∅ .  
Thus   [ ( ) ( \ )] [ \ ( ( ) ( \ ))]S N S A S N Sυ υ χ χ∩ ∩ ∪ =∅ . 
Hence       ( ) ( \ ) ( ) ( \ )S N S S N Sυ υ χ χ∩ ⊆ ∪          
  
   COROLLARY 1.  
(i) A control structure is not an H&M control structure if one of the following 
conditions holds for some S N⊆ : 
   (a) ( ) ( \ )S N S Aυ υ∩ =  and ( ) ( \ )S N S Aχ χ∪ ≠    
 (b) ( ) ( \ )S N Sχ χ∪ = ∅  and ( ) ( \ )S N Sυ υ∩ ≠ ∅  
(ii) An ownership structure is an H&M control structure but an H&M control 
structure is not always an ownership structure 
An H&M control structure is a special category of control structure. 
H&M implicitly rule out control structures where two disjoint coalitions may 
access all assets if some assets are not vetoed (a) or where some agents may 
have (multiple) access on some assets and jointly veto them (b).  Consider a 
simple partnership where two partners 1, 2 have joint veto on an asset a . 
Each agent can access the asset ( (1) aυ = , (2) aυ = ) but no agent has veto 
individually ( (1) , (2) , (1,2) aχ χ χ= ∅ =∅ = ). This structure is not H&M 
since (1) (2) aυ υ∩ =  and (1) (2)χ χ∪ =∅ . In H&M a partnership 
implies that agents cannot access the asset individually 
( (1) , (2) , (1,2) aυ υ υ= ∅ =∅ = ) i.e. joint veto implies joint access. This 
constraint also rules out a great number of hybrid governance structures such 
as licensing or franchising. In a licensing structure both the licensor and the 
licensee have access to the technology and they jointly veto its use by other 
agents (the licensor vetoes the use of the technology by other agents than the 
licensee and the licensee vetoes the marketing of the technology by other 
agents in its territory).  
Our notion of control differs from H&M in several ways. First we account for 
agents who may have veto rights but no access (e.g. shareholders)24. We also 
                                                 
24 Shareholders are excluded in H&M (who only consider owner-managed firms) because the 
notion of residual control right encompasses the right to use the asset. 
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allow for the productive control of the same asset by two individuals. Finally, 
we allocate a more direct role for agents who can access an asset without 
owning it (e.g. employees). Overall our notion of (productive) control 
accounts for the fact that, in real life, managers may control the use of assets 
even if they do not ‘own’ them. Hence we broaden the GHM framework to 
incorporate the Berle and Means (1932) insight emphasizing the separation of 
ownership and control 25 . But we suggest an alternative, the separation 
between veto (by shareholders) and access (by managers): both give control. 
The second part of the proposition expresses that the notion of 
‘control’ in H&M is in fact different from our concept of ownership. In H&M 
an agent does not have to have access and veto to control a set of assets. For 
example, a control structure where ( ) ( )S Sυ χ⊂  (i.e. the agents who have 
veto do not have to have access) is an H&M structure. So if the H&M’s 
notion of control structure is not equivalent to ownership, we should be 
careful in interpreting their result in terms of ownership26.  
 
2.3. Optimal investment and welfare 
( , )v S A x|  is the value generated by a coalition S N⊆  controlling a set of 
assets A A⊆  . where 1( ,..., )nx x x=  is the vector of investments by the 
agents of N  ( ix  is the ex-ante investment in human capital by agent i ). In 
coalition S , agent i ’s marginal return on investment is given by 
( , ) / ( , )iiv S A x x v S A x∂ | ∂ ≡ | . The value generated will be sensitive to the 
relationships between the agents of the coalition and between the assets 
controlled by the coalition.  
Given a control structure β , an agent i  will choose her level of investment 
ix  in order to maximize her ex-ante net benefit ( ) ( )i i iB x C xβ | −  where 
{ } { }( ) ( )[ ( , ( ) ) ( \ , ( \ )]i
S i S
B x p S v S S x v S i S i xβ β β
| ∈
| = | − |∑  is the share 
                                                 
25 The necessity to incorporate both perspectives into a unified framework is highlighted and 
analyzed in Bolton and Scharfstein (1998).   
26 Control in H&M is also not equivalent to veto, since for example a pure access structure 
where ( ) ( )S Sβ υ=  and ( ) ( \ )S N Sυ υ∩ =∅  (with no one having veto) is an H&M 
control structure.  
of value of i  given by her Shapley value27 ( ( )p S 28 are the coefficients of the 
Shapley value), and ( )i iC x  is the cost of investment ix  to agent i  ( iC  is 
assumed to be a standard twice differentiable convex function). The Nash 
equilibrium investment ( )ex β  is characterized by the first order conditions 
'( , ( ) ) ( ( ))
e
ei
i i
i
B S S x C x
x
β β∂ | =∂ , i.e.  
'( ) ( , ( ) ( )) ( ( ))i e ei i
S i S
p S v S S x C xβ β β
| ∈
| =∑  for all i     (1.4) 
From now on we will adopt a simplified notation by dropping the argument 
x  whenever there is no confusion (i.e. we will write ( , )v S A  for 
( , )v S A x| ). 
We assume that ( , ) ( , ),i iv S v i S∅ ≡ ∅ ∀  and follow H&M in assuming 
concavity of v  in x , superadditivity (i.e. 
( , ) ( ', ') ( \ ', \ ')v S A v S A v S S A A≥ + , ' , 'S S A A∀ ⊆ ⊆ ), complementarity 
of investments (i.e. ( / ) ( , ) 0,ijx v S A x j i∂ ∂ | ≥ ∀ ≠ ), and human capital 
investment ( ( , ) 0iv S A =  when i S∉ ).  
 
First-best: superadditivity implies that the maximum total value is 
( , )v N A x|  and the first-best overall surplus is achieved by maximizing 
1
( ) ( , ) ( )
n
i i
i
W x v N A x C x
=
= | −∑ . The first best level of investment *x  is 
given by the first order conditions: 
* ' *( , ) ( )i i iv N A x C x| =  for all i     (1.5) 
We now deviate from H&M by replacing their assumption 6 29  by the 
following. 
                                                 
27  We follow H&M (1990) in using the Shapley value as solution concept. For a non-
cooperative justification of the Shapley value, see Gul (1989) and Stole and Zwiebel (1996b). 
28 
( 1)!( )!( )
!
s n sp S
n
− −=  where s S= . 
29 ( , ) ( ', '), ' , 'i iv S A v S A S S A A≥ ∀ ⊆ ∀ ⊆  (hereafter HM6).  
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   ASSUMPTION A1. ( , ) ( ', ) ( , )i i iv S A v S A v N A≤ ≤ , , ,i S A A∀ ∈ ∀ ⊆  
'S S N∀ ⊆ ⊆  
 
The marginal return generated by any coalition S controlling a set of assets 
A  increases with the number of agents and is always (weakly) lower than the 
marginal return generated by the grand coalition (controlling all assets). 
Assumption A1 is weaker than HM6 (which in addition requires that all 
assets be complementary at the margin 30 ). Nonetheless the same 
underinvestment results as in H&M. 
 
   LEMMA 1. Under assumption A1, for any control structure there is always 
underinvestment and if every agent’s marginal return on investment 
increases then the equilibrium investment increases and welfare increases.  
Proof. See Appendix 
 
We will say that a control structure 'β  is more efficient than a control 
structure β  if the former leads to a higher level of welfare. The rest of the 
paper will assume that assumption A1 holds and that there is always 
underinvestment31.  
 
2.4. Asset complementarity and substitution at the margin 
In our analysis, we will use notions of complementarity and substitution at 
the margin32, which are a convenient way of summarizing how the relations 
between assets affect the marginal contribution of the agents. These are of 
course different from the notions of ‘absolute’ complementarity or 
substitution of assets which describe the effect of the relations between assets 
on the value v  (in our framework assets are assumed to be complementary, 
                                                 
30 See section 3.2 below. 
31  Underinvestment is not only coherent with the H&M framework. This is also a very 
plausible assumption in the real world, especially when focusing on human capital investment, 
and under-provision of incentives is a common empirical finding. In most cases, it is required 
to increase human capital investment through incentives and it is difficult to imagine what an 
overinvestment in human capital would be. 
32 Hart (1995) defines and uses the notion of complementarity at the margin. We complement 
it with the concept of substitution at the margin.  
since the value function is superadditive in assets). We say that two assets 
controlled by a coalition are complementary [substitutes] at the margin, if the 
marginal contribution of any agent in the coalition is higher [lower] when the 
coalition controls both assets than when it controls only one. Formally, 1 2,a a  
are complementary [substitutes] at the margin when 
{ } { }1 2 1( , , ) [ ] ( , )i iv S a a v S a≥ ≤  and { } { }1 2 2( , , ) [ ] ( , )i iv S a a v S a≥ ≤ , i S∀ ∈ . 
We will now study the optimal control structure and get our main results. The 
following section will successively cover the cases where assets are all 
complementary at the margin (as in H&M), where assets are all substitutes at 
the margin and the general case (some assets complementary, some 
substitutes). 
 
3. Main results 
 
3.1. When assets are complementary (at the margin) 
    ASSUMPTION A2: assets are all complementary (at the margin), i.e.  
( , ) ( , ')i iv S A v S A≤ , , , 'i S S N A A∀ ∈ ∀ ⊆ ∀ ⊆  
 
H&M assume that assumptions A1 and A2 hold (A1+A2 = HM6). In this 
section, we will follow their framework. 
In the analysis that follows we will be interested in a partial ordering of the 
control structures. The framework developed by Segal (2003) will be useful 
here. In his paper, Segal defines three types of integration contracts between 
agents owning resources. Exclusion, when an agent can exclude another 
agent’s resource but not use it himself (i.e. one agent gives veto power on his 
resource to the second agent). Inclusion, when an agent can use another 
agent’s resource but not exclude him from using it (i.e. one agent gives 
access on his resource to the second agent). Collusion when both agents 
merge their resources in the hands of one of them (i.e. one agent gives 
ownership – both veto and access – on his resource to the second agent).  
Considering two control structures β  and 'β , we will say that β  is more 
inclusive than 'β  (or 'β  is more exclusive than β ) if 
'( ) ( ),S S S Nβ β⊆ ∀ ⊆ . By extension, we will say that an allocation of 
rights is inclusive (resp. exclusive) if it leads to a more inclusive (resp. 
exclusive) control structure. 
  10 
 
   LEMMA 2.  Allocating access (rights) is inclusive and more inclusive than 
allocating ownership. Allocating veto (rights) is exclusive and more exclusive 
than allocating ownership.  
 
Proof. Starting from a control structure ( ) ( ) \ ( \ )S S N Sβ υ χ= , allocating 
access rights to an agent i  leads to a new access function 'υ  such that 
( ) '( ),S S S iυ υ⊆ ∀ ⊇ . Hence the new control structure 
'( ) \ ( \ )a S N Sβ υ χ=  is such that ( ) ( ),aS S S iβ β⊆ ∀ ⊇ . So allocating 
access is inclusive. Idem for veto where ( ) '( ),S S S iχ χ⊆ ∀ ⊇  so 
( \ ) '( \ ),N S N S S iχ χ⊆ ∀ ⊇  and the new control structure 
( ) \ '( )v S Sβ υ χ=  is such that  ( ) ( ),v S S S iβ β⊆ ∀ ⊇ . If we allocate 
ownership to i  (i.e. veto and access on the same assets), we have a new 
control structure '( ) \ '( \ )o S N Sβ υ χ= such that: 
 
( ) '( ) \ ( \ ) ( )
( ) ( ) \ '( \ ) ( )
o a
o v
S S N S S
S i
S S N S S
β υ χ β
β υ χ β
= = ∀ ⊇⊇ = 
 
( ) '( ) \ ( \ ) ( )
( ) ( ) \ '( \ ) ( )
o a
o v
S S N S S
S i
S S N S S
β υ χ β
β υ χ β
⊆ = ∀ ⊇= = 
 
Thus ( ) ( ) ( ),v o aS S S Sβ β β⊆ ⊆ ∀ . 
 
With our definition of control, allocating more access rights can only (weakly) 
increase the number of assets controlled by a coalition since some coalitions 
get new access to some assets. Allocating more veto rights can only (weakly) 
decrease the number of assets controlled by a coalition, since some assets are 
now vetoed by additional agents. The effect of ownership is intermediary 
since ownership comes with both access and veto rights. 
  
    
 
 
 
PROPOSITION 2. When assets are complementary (at the margin) (i) a more 
inclusive control structure is more efficient (ii) allocating access increases 
welfare and is more efficient than allocating ownership (iii) the optimal 
control structure *β is the access structure where 
* *( ) ( )S S Aβ υ= = , *( )Sχ = ∅ , S N∀ ⊆   
 
Proof. (i) When assets are complementary at the margin 
( , ( )) ( , '( ))i iv S S v S Sβ β≤  if ( ) '( )S Sβ β⊆ . Thus, by Lemma 2, 'β  is 
more efficient.  
(ii)-(iii) The result derives directly from Lemma 1  
(iv) The most inclusive control structure will be optimal and 
allocating access is inclusive (and allocating veto is exclusive). So the most 
inclusive control structure will be obtained when 
( )  and ( ) ,S A S Sυ χ= = ∅ ∀  , i.e. when ( ) ,S A Sβ = ∀ . 
 
Proposition 2 shows that the highest (second best) level of welfare is 
achieved with an access structure and that ownership is inefficient. In fact, 
given any control structure, allocating more access rights will increase 
welfare. It is efficient for an agent to give access on her asset to a second 
agent when assets are complementary because it increases the incentives of 
the agent who is given access and the incentives of the other agents 
(‘external’ to the relationship between the two agents). In the latter case the 
agent who is given access will bring the complementary asset in his 
relationship with the external agents. So open access is the best structure 
when assets are complementary at the margin, which seems to contradict the 
idea of property rights and the well known ‘tragedy of the commons’ problem.  
This is because in the ‘tragedy of the commons’ agents impose 
negative externalities on other agents. In our framework, this would mean 
that agents are substitutes at the margin33 (when more agents access an asset, 
it decreases the marginal return of each agent). As we will see in the next 
section, substitution at the margin calls for the allocation of veto rights34. But 
                                                 
33 ( , ) ( ', ), , ',i iv S A v S A i S S S A≥ ∀ ∈ ∀ ⊆ ∀  
34 In our paper, we focus on the substitution at the margin between assets, but we might as well 
have studied substitution at the margin between agents. The main results of this paper would 
hold. 
  11 
in the H&M (and our) framework, agents are complementary at the margin, 
and there is no need for veto.  
So why is it that H&M find ownership efficient when assets are 
complementary? This is because the constraint on the H&M control structure 
(two disjoint coalitions cannot control the same asset) generates a negative 
externality between agents which re-establishes the need for veto rights. 
There is no such constraint in our model, hence no need for veto. Note that 
the optimal control structure is not an H&M control structure35. If we restrain 
the scope to H&M control structures, the role of ownership as an efficient 
mechanism to foster incentives can be restored. 
But ownership may not be the only solution to the tragedy of the 
commons in presence of negative externalities. In the classical Property 
Rights theory36, the solution is to internalize these externalities by allocating 
veto to some agents, provided that the benefits of establishing these rights are 
higher than their costs. These agents then get ownership (access and veto) 
and we move from an open access regime (or collective ownership) to a 
private property rights regime. But while the effect of access is always 
positive (it increases incentives of the agent who is given access and of the 
other agents), veto has two facets: a positive effect (it increases the incentives 
of the agents protected by their veto right37) and a negative effect (it reduces 
incentives of the other agents). Rules of use or ‘governance’ among those 
with access to the assets may be an alternative (Smith, 2002) to the allocation 
of veto. Smith shows that in reality there seems to be a continuum of 
successful solutions between the pure allocation of veto rights and the 
adoption of ‘governance’ rules (the choice along this continuum depending 
on the relative cost structure of the different solutions). At the extreme, if we 
restrict A  to be the assets of a given firm, it may well be that the adoption of 
governance rules (i.e. hierarchy, authority and fiat) among the agents of the 
firm has a better cost structure than the allocation of veto.  
In summary, we show that an access structure is optimal when assets 
are complementary because in our model the use of assets does not generate 
conflict (unlike veto). The governance structure within the firm will prevent 
                                                 
35 Since ( ) ( \ ) ( ) ( \ )S N S S N Sυ υ χ χ∩ ⊄ ∪  (see Proposition 1). 
36 Demsetz (1967). 
37 Demsetz explains that an owner ‘by virtue of his power to exclude others’ gets incentives to 
utilize assets more efficiently. 
(or limit) externalities to occur (e.g. the use of an asset by an employee will 
be regulated, employees will have to maintain the equipment,…) which will 
maintain the superiority of an access structure over an ownership structure. 
Note that the ‘no veto’ of the access structure is in fact equivalent to a joint 
veto on A  by N . In other words the agents of the firm collectively limit the 
amount of externalities by restricting access to the employees38.  
For example, Christian Lacroix (a famous French fashion designer) 
has a personal firm whose (essentially human capital) assets are strictly 
complementary to the assets of the Christian Lacroix firm (hereafter CL): the 
latter are worthless without him. But despite the prediction of H&M’s 
model39, Christian Lacroix does not own CL (nor even any share of the firm). 
CL is owned by LVMH (the worldwide leader in luxury products) together 
with many other complementary firms (they share common services: 
financial, legal, fiscal, marketing,…). Instead, his personal firm has a contract 
with CL, whereby he provides his services and gets access to the physical 
assets (with high powered incentives).  
So in our framework when should an ownership structure be optimal? 
It can be shown that an ownership structure is (weakly) optimal when the 
agents are indispensable40 (the proof is straightforward and left to the reader). 
The intuition is that being indispensable is equivalent to having veto power 
(the other agents cannot work on the asset without the indispensable agent). 
Thus giving access to an indispensable agent is equivalent to this agent 
having ownership (access and veto). 
So far we followed the asset complementarity assumption of H&M. We now 
relax it and turn to the opposite case.  
 
 
                                                 
38 This is the difference between open access (where no one has the right to exclude others) 
and common property (members of a ‘clearly demarked group’ have the rights to exclude 
nonmembers) (Ostrom, 2000). According to Ostrom, income in a modern corporation can be 
seen as a common pool of resources to be shared by stockholders, management and employees, 
and ‘relationships within the firm are far from being ‘individual’ ownership rights’.   
39 Proposition 8 of H&M states that ‘if two (or more) assets are strictly complementary, they 
should be owned together’. 
40 An agent i is indispensable to an asset a  if, without agent i  in a coalition, a  has no effect 
on the marginal return for the agents of the coalition 
( { }( , ) ( , \ ),  for ,  if j jv S A v S A a j S i S≡ ∈ ∉ ) (H&M). 
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3.2. When assets are substitutes (at the margin) 
H&M not only assume complementarity through superadditivity (their 
assumption 5) but also complementarity at the margin (their assumption 6). 
Despite being rather strong41, the latter is at the basis of all propositions in 
their paper. But assets may be complementary without being complementary 
at the margin42. Two of Coase’s (1937) main arguments for the limitation of 
the size of the firm are that as firms get larger (i.e. the number of assets 
increase) there are ‘decreasing returns to the entrepreneur function’43 and ‘the 
entrepreneur fails to place the factors of production in their best use’. In other 
words, adding assets reduces the marginal return on investment by the 
entrepreneur (what the economists call ‘diminishing returns to 
management’44). Other scholars have also studied diminishing return to scope 
of monitoring i.e. ‘loss of control’ (Williamson, 1967, Calvo and Wellisz, 
1978) or the fact that focusing on fewer assets brings economies of 
specialization and coordination (Rotemberg and Saloner, 1994). Moreover, 
there is multiple empirical evidence that refocusing (Berger and Ofek, 1999), 
spin-offs (Daley et al., 1997) and downsizing (Dial and Murphy, 1995) may 
increase firm performance and create value by ‘allowing managers to focus 
attention on the core operations they are best suited to manage’ (Daley et al., 
1997). It seems to us that a model studying the boundaries of the firm should 
integrate this key intuition. The reasons generally invoked to justify mergers 
focus on pure complementarity (sharing of fixed costs, economies of 
scope,…) because substitution (or complementarity) at the margin is difficult 
to measure. But the relative un-success of mergers as outlined by the 
empirical literature may be partly due to this substitution effect at the margin 
(e.g. managers spread too thin)45. Adding a complementary asset to a set of 
complementary assets (in a superadditive game) does not ensure that the new 
asset is complementary at the margin with all existing assets. If it is substitute 
                                                 
41 ‘stronger than the others’ (H&M). 
42 This has been somehow pointed out by Stole and Zwiebel (1998) who mention that ‘while 
the characteristic function underlying many cooperative games is taken to be superadditive, 
this by no means implies that different parties would increase their combined Shapley value by 
merging’.  
43 GH dismiss this point as ‘unconvincing’ because the owner/entrepreneur could always hire 
another manager. But they overlook the fact that the owner would then have to manage and 
monitor the additional manager… 
44 Coase (1937). 
45 Mailath et al. (2004) show that mergers may increase the cost of inducing managerial effort. 
at the margin46, the merger will face some trade-offs which cannot easily be 
resolved with the allocation of unified ownership47. In that context, allocating 
access and veto separately may provide a solution. Anyway, the contrasting 
roles that substitution and complementarity may play have been highlighted 
in several models (Stole and Zwiebel, 1996a, RZ, Segal and Whinston, 2000, 
and Segal, 2003) and we feel the need to relax the assumption on 
complementarity at the margin. We assume now that all assets are substitutes 
(at the margin) before studying the more general situation where some assets 
are complementary and some substitutes (at the margin). 
   ASSUMPTION A3: assets are all substitutes at the margin in the absence of 
some agents in N ,  
i.e.  ( , ) ( , '), , ( ) ',i iv S A v S A S N A A i S≥ ∀ ⊂ ∀ ≠∅ ⊆ ∀ ∈  
( ( , ) ( , '),i iv S v S A S N∅ ≤ ∀ ⊆ ). 
 
Assets are substitutes at the margin when an increase in the supply of assets 
decreases the marginal return of investment. For example, in a production 
function 1( , ) ( ,..., , )nv S A v x x A= )  where ix  is the investment by i S∈  and 
k
k
a A
A a
∈
= ∑
)
) , the assets are substitutes at the margin if the agents’ investments 
are gross q-substitutes 48  with respect to A) (
2
0,
i
v i S
x A
∂ ≤ ∀ ∈∂ ∂)
), i.e. an 
increase in the supply of assets decreases the marginal product of the 
‘investment’ factor (the Hicks elasticity of complementarity between 
investments and assets is negative). A typical CES function 
/( , ) ( )ri
i S
v S A x Aρ ρ ρ
∈
= +∑ ) would have this property with appropriate value 
of the elasticity of substitution49.  
 
                                                 
46 In the taxicab example we have seen that substitution at the margin has negative effects on 
the incentives to invest. 
47 See Stole and Zwiebel (1998). 
48 See Hicks (1970) or Bertoletti (2003). 
49 I am indebted to Bertoletti for this insight. 
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   PROPOSITION 3. When assets are substitutes at the margin (i) if 
( ) 1iβ >   for some i ,  a more exclusive control structure increases welfare 
(and allocating veto is more efficient than allocating ownership) (ii) an 
optimal control structure *β is characterized by a partition { }0 1,N N  of 
N such that: (a) * 0( ) ,i i Nβ = ∅ ∀ ∈ , (b) * 1( ) 1,i i Nβ = ∀ ∈ ,              
(c)  * *( ) ( )
i S
S iβ β
∈
=U  if 1S N∩ ≠∅  
 Proof. See Appendix 
 
When assets are substitutes at the margin, allocating veto can increase 
welfare and in an optimal control structure, no agent will control more than 
one asset. Also a coalition will only control the assets controlled by its 
individual members (if at least one of them controls an asset). 
In H&M assets are complementary at the margin and additional assets 
provide incentives because the outside option of the owner (i.e. the threat to 
withdraw her assets) increases with the number of assets that she controls. 
But when assets are substitutes at the margin and the agent controls more 
than one asset, decreasing the number of assets controlled by the agent 
increases her outside option. So outside veto is good because it increases the 
outside option of the agent (without affecting the incentives of the agent who 
is given veto) and it is also good for the other ‘external’ agents because the 
agent who has given veto will not bring her substitute asset with her in the 
relationship. However, when the agent controls only one asset, outside veto 
will actually decrease her outside option (her marginal return with one asset 
is always higher than with no asset). But it will also increase her marginal 
return in the relationship (she does not bring a substitute asset with her). So 
the net effect on the marginal return of the agent is unclear. Overall, in an 
optimal control structure no agent should control more than one asset.  
The second part of the proposition tells us that, in an optimal control structure, 
if some agents in a coalition control one asset then the coalition will only 
control the assets controlled by its members (it would be inefficient for the 
coalition to control more assets since the assets are substitutes at the margin). 
On the other hand, if no agent in the coalition controls any asset, then the 
coalition should control no asset or one asset (controlling one asset may be 
more efficient in some cases). 
In this economy, agents are partitioned between those who do control one 
asset ( 1N ) and those who do not ( 0N ). If 0N = ∅ , each agent controls one 
asset and a coalition controls the assets controlled by its members (but several 
agents may control the same asset). This may only happen if the number of 
assets is higher than the number of agents. If 1N = ∅ , then no agent 
individually controls any asset and an asset can only be controlled by a group 
of agents. Assuming that no asset is idle in an optimal control structure50, this 
may only happen if the number of assets is lower than the number of agents. 
In the general case both 0N  and 1N  will be non empty, and we will now 
attempt to characterize 1 0,N N . 
- Productivity and substitution  
We introduce a new statistic, the substitution effect, which characterizes the 
level of substitution between an asset a  and other assets A  ( A ≠ ∅ ) and its 
impact on the marginal return for an agent i , i.e. 
{ }( , ) ( , ) ( , ),a i iiSE S A v S A v S A a i S= − ∪ ∈ . The substitution effect 
characterizes the negative impact on i ’s marginal return, in her relationship 
with the other agents of S , of adding a  to other assets (substitutes at the 
margin). It represents the managerial diminishing returns on coordination or 
monitoring. 
The marginal productivity of agent i  with an asset a  is the difference in 
marginal return for i  with and without the asset alone, i.e. 
( , ) ( , )a i iiP v i a v i= − ∅  (by definition non negative). We will use the 
following definition. 
   
 DEFINITION. (i) An agent i  is highly productive with an asset a  if her 
marginal productivity with the asset alone is higher than n  times the 
maximum substitution effect between a  and any other set A  of assets. That 
is ( , ), ,a ai iP nSE S A S A≥ ∀ ∀ .  
Formally: { },( , ) ( , ) [ ( , ) ( , )]i i i iS Av i a v i nMax v S A v S A a− ∅ ≥ − ∪   
                                                 
50 An idle asset would not be productive, which is suboptimal by definition. 
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 (ii) An agent i  has low productivity with a  if, 
(1/ ) ( , ), ,a ai i iP q n SE S A S A≤ ∀ ∀ ,  
where [ ( , ) ( , )] /[ ( , ) ( , )]i i i iiq v N a v N v i a v i= − ∅ − ∅ . 
Formally: { },( , ) ( , ) (1/ ) [ ( , ) ( , )]i i i ii S Av i a v i q n Min v S A v S A a− ∅ ≤ − ∪  
 
Note that our notion of high or low productivity is taken relative to the 
substitution effect. When assets are all complementary at the margin (as in 
H&M), the substitution effect is non positive and the agents are all highly 
productive. We will now try to characterize the optimal control structure(s) in 
more detail. 
 
   LEMMA 3. When assets are substitutes at the margin (i) control over an 
asset increases incentives of a highly productive agent but decreases 
incentives of a low productivity agent, (ii) control by a highly productive 
agent is more efficient than by a low productivity agent 
 
Proof. See Appendix 
 
A direct consequence of Lemma 3 is that control over an asset should be 
allocated in priority to a highly productive agent (if there is such agent) and a 
low productivity agent should only control an asset if there is no highly 
productive agent with the asset who does not control any asset (otherwise it 
would be more efficient to give her control over the asset). In an optimal 
structure, there is a ‘pecking order’ in the allocation of control. As a 
consequence, we allow an additional assumption: an agent who does not 
control any asset has low productivity (with any asset). So, in which case 
should an agent control an asset? This question can be answered by 
examining the way veto should be allocated (in the following, aS  is the 
group of agents who access the asset a ). 
 
    
 
 
 
 
   PROPOSITION 4.  In an optimal control structure *β , when assets are 
substitutes at the margin, 
(i) If an agent accessing an asset is highly productive, he should veto it 
( *( )i aβ = ) 
(ii) If a group of agents accessing an asset are individually highly productive 
with it, they should have joint veto on it ( * *( ) , ( )ai a S aβ β= = ) 
(iii) A low productivity agent should not access an asset already accessed by 
an agent 
(iii) If an agent accessing an asset has low productivity with it, there should 
be outside veto on the asset ( *( )iβ = ∅ )  
(iv) If no agent individually accesses an asset, a group of low productivity 
agents may jointly access it. They should jointly veto it if they are collectively 
highly productive with it ( * *( ) , ( )ai S aβ β= ∅ = ), otherwise there should 
be outside veto 
(v) Unproductive agents (outside parties) may have outside veto on some 
assets 
 
Proof. In the Appendix 
 
Proposition 4 justifies the existence of four types of optimal governance 
structures based upon the number of productive agents who access an asset 
and their level of productivity: 
- Owner-managed firm, when the agent who accesses the asset is highly 
productive with it. The control structure is:  * * *( ) ( ) ( )i i i aβ υ χ= = =  
(single access, single veto) 
- Partnership: several highly productive agents access an asset. *( ) ,iβ = ∅  
* *( ) , ( )ii a iυ χ= = ∅  * * *( ) ( ) ( )a a aS S S aβ υ χ= = =  (multiple access, 
joint veto) 
- Outside ownership: there is no highly productive agent for the asset and a 
low productivity agent accesses the asset. * * *( ) , ( ) , ( )ii i a iβ υ χ= ∅ = =∅ ; 
*s.t. ( ) ,k k aχ∃ =  *( )k aυ ⊃  (single access, outside veto) 
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- Joint ownership: no agent individually accesses an asset but a group of 
agents jointly does. * * *( ) ( ) ( )i i iβ υ χ= = = ∅ ; 
* * *( ) ( ) ( )a a aS S S aβ υ χ= = =  (joint access, joint veto) 
From the above we get that a low productivity agent does not control 
any asset ( *( ) 0iβ = ) (if she accesses the asset, there is outside veto on it) 
and a highly productive agent controls an asset if and only if she accesses it 
( * *( ) 1 ( ) 1i iβ υ= ⇔ = ) (if she accesses it, she should also veto it).  In the 
partition of N , a low productivity agent always belongs to 0N , while a 
highly productive agent may belong to 1N  or 0N .  
Proposition 4 shows the important and diverse role that veto can play 
in an optimal control structure when assets are substitutes at the margin. Two 
forms of veto play a special role: outside veto and joint veto.  
Here is an intuition for outside veto. Since the value that can be 
generated by a coalition is superadditive in assets, there is always a desire to 
bring assets together. But when assets are substitute at the margin, the 
marginal product declines when assets are merged, so investment falls. The 
way to overcome this is to include other agents to give the commitment value 
not to merge. In this framework, this is done by giving a veto right on the 
asset to another agent. Allocating veto to an outside party is better than 
keeping ownership because it reduces the incentive to invest on substitute 
assets. In other words, the veto power of outside parties (e.g. shareholders) 
serves to prevent managers to merge substitute assets. This provides a 
justification for the role of outside ownership5152.  
                                                 
51  Rajan & Zingales (1998) have found a justification which is somehow related. They 
highlight the role of ownership by a non-investing party (i.e. a third party) in absorbing the 
opportunity losses from specialization that the manager would otherwise incur if she would 
own the asset. For them ‘those who have access, and thus the privileged right to invest, have a 
kind of control right which can be misused when coupled with the control rights of ownership’. 
This is a way of saying that access and veto may have to be disconnected. In their model 
outside ownership protects the incentives of the manager to specialize. In our framework, it 
prevents the manager to merge its asset with other substitute assets, i.e. it protects the 
incentives of the manager to specialize on its own asset.   
52 Segal and Whinston (2000) observe that, with substitute investments, ‘it may be optimal to 
give ownership of the “exclusivity asset” to a noninvesting party’. 
But in our framework, outside veto is not always efficient (when 
assets are substitutes at the margin). It is efficient only when the agent has 
low productivity. In that case, it increases the marginal return of the agent in 
the relationship with the other agents who control substitute assets but it 
decreases her outside option with her asset. If the agent has low productivity 
with the asset, the overall effect is positive and her bargaining position 
improves. It is positive for the other agents she will bargain with since her 
value in the coalition increases, so the overall effect on welfare is positive. 
But the opposite is true for a highly productive agent. 
It is worth keeping in mind that the terms highly productive and low 
productivity are taken relative to the substitution impact. A firm will be 
owned by a productive agent (owner-managed firm) if her marginal 
productivity with the asset alone is sufficiently high. But if her marginal 
productivity is lower than the substitution effect, then it will be optimal to 
have outside ownership53 (other productive agents or outside parties will have 
veto on the asset). A firm originally owner-managed may turn to outside 
ownership for two reasons: if the productivity of the owner with the asset 
decreases below a certain level or if the substitution effect increases above a 
certain threshold (e.g. if the ‘differentiation’ of the firm becomes too small). 
The term of outside ownership should not be viewed stricto sensu. In fact our 
model sees the emergence of third parties who get outside veto on an asset 
without having access on it (i.e. they do not have ownership). This is true in 
the case of shareholders, but a corporate vice-president making the final 
decision on asset allocation between two divisions would be another 
example54.   
Joint veto plays also a special role in Proposition 4. The intuition 
here is that when highly productive agents access an asset, individual veto by 
one of them would reduce the incentives of the others. A contrario, joint veto 
is good because it protects productive agents who access the asset together 
from vetoing each other, while preventing to ‘merge’ the asset with ‘external’ 
substitute assets. This finds an illustration in partnerships. Professional 
partnerships are characterized by ‘individualized, autonomous day-to-day 
activity’ combined with ‘a system of control in which authority is shared by 
                                                 
53 We use the term outside ownership to relate to the literature. What we really mean is outside 
veto. 
54 See Bolton and Scharfstein (1998) on General Motors and Fisher Body. 
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all members of the working group’ (Greenwood & al., 1990). The first aspect 
illustrates multiple access while the second represents joint veto. 
Our framework also highlights that joint ownership may be optimal55 
when assets are substitutes at the margin. We find here some commonalities 
with the literature on joint ownership56.  
Together, Propositions 2 and 4 provide some indication for the 
boundaries of the firm and propose an answer to a major critique made by 
Holmstrom (1999) on the H&M model, literally that ‘the theoretical 
predictions concerning joint ventures, sole ownership of complementary 
assets and outside ownership are all quite fragile’. Overall, a firm may be 
defined as a collection of complementary (at the margin) assets which are 
substitutes (at the margin) to other firms/assets. Proposition 2 says that when 
assets are complementary (i.e. within a firm), allocating access to all agents is 
better than allocating ownership to some. Proposition 4 says that when assets 
are substitutes (i.e. among firms) outside parties may have veto power rather 
than ownership and productive agents should give veto on their asset to 
outside agents (shareholders) when their productivity is lower than the 
substitution impact with the other assets. Proposition 2 highlights the role of 
workers/managers (agents with access but no veto) when assets are 
complementary. Proposition 4 highlights the role of shareholders (agents 
with veto but no access) when assets are substitutes. Proposition 4 also 
characterizes the optimality of joint ownership when no agent individually 
accesses an asset. Both propositions show the independent role of access and 
veto, and that ownership may not always be the best driver for investment 
incentives.   
So far we have focused on environments where assets are either all 
complementary or all substitutes (at the margin). But these represent rather 
extreme cases and, in general, the relationships between assets may be more 
complex.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
55 In H&M, joint ownership is not optimal because assets are complementary at the margin.  
56 Cai (2003) provides a condition for optimal joint ownership. Joint ownership is optimal 
when specific and general investments are substitutes, which resembles our substitutability 
condition on assets. 
3.3. General case: complementary and substitute assets 
At this stage it is important to precise the notion of complementarity and 
substitution between assets. When assets 1a  and 2a  are bilaterally 
complementary  ( 1 11 2 1( , , ) ( , )v S a a v S a≥ ), the presence of a third asset 0a  
may in some cases reduce the complementarity between the two assets 
( 1 10 1 2 0 1( , , , ) ( , , )v S a a a v S a a≤ ). In other words 2a  is complementary to 1a  
in the absence of 0a  but substitute to 1a  in presence of 0a . More generally, 
we will use the following definitions.  
Two assets ,k la a  are always complementary [resp. substitutes] at the margin 
if { }( , ) [ ] ( , )i i lv S A v S A a≤ ≥ ∪ , , ki S A a∀ ∈ ∀ ⊇  (they are independent in 
case of equality). An asset ka  is complementary [resp. substitute] to an asset 
la  in absence of another asset ma  if and only if 
, , with l mi S A a a A∀ ∈ ∀ ⊇ ⊄ , { }( , ) [ ] ( , )i ikv S A a v S A∪ ≥ ≤ .  
With 3 assets, ,i ja a  cannot be always complementary if ,j ka a  are always 
substitutes. 
In our framework, when some assets are substitutes and some are 
complementary, we are not able to derive general conditions for an optimal 
structure without imposing some restrictions. So we start from a situation 
where some agents , , ,...i j k  respectively own assets , , ,...i j ka a a  (an 
ownership structure) and will be interested in finding a reallocation of rights 
that would generate a more efficient control structure. If this new structure 
cannot be improved, we will have an optimal control structure. The initial set 
up is identical to Segal (2003) who analyzes the different types of integration 
between agents who originally own their own asset. But Segal studies a zero-
sum game where the gains of one coalition impose a negative externality of 
the complementary coalition, and finds different results. 
There are different ways of reallocating the rights on an asset, but 
they come down to four types. Agent j  may give access on ia  (and 
renounce to her veto power, i.e. i  and j  have joint veto) to  i  
( ( ) , ; ( )i j ii a a i aυ χ= = ; ( ) ; ( )jj a jυ χ= = ∅ ; multiple access), give veto 
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( ( ) ; ( ) ,i i ji a i a aυ χ= = ; ( ) ; ( )j jj a j aυ χ= = ; joint ownership/multiple 
veto), give ownership ( ( ) , ; ( ) ,i j i ji a a i a aυ χ= = ; ( ) ; ( )j jυ χ= ∅ =∅ ; 
integration by i ), or keep separate ownership 
( ( ) ; ( )i ii a i aυ χ= = ; ( ) ; ( )j jj a j aυ χ= = ; non integration) 57 . The first 
allocation is inclusive, the second is exclusive and the third is collusive58. 
    
   PROPOSITION 5. When agents , , ,...i j k  respectively own assets 
, , ,...i j ka a a  (i) j  should give access on her asset to i  if ,i ja a  are always 
complementary in absence of j  (ii) j  should give veto to i  if , in absence of 
i , ,j ka a  are substitutes for all ka  and j  has low productivity with ja   
Proof.  In the Appendix 
 
   COROLLARY 2. j  should give ownership to i  if ,i ja a  are always 
complementary in absence of j  and if, in absence of i , ,j ka a  are 
substitutes for all ka  and j  has low productivity with ja   
 
Proposition 5 shows that with complementary and substitute assets, access, 
veto and ownership have specific roles to play to foster investment incentives. 
And, by Corollary 2, the optimality of integration depends not only on the 
complementarity between two assets (as in H&M) but also on the level of 
substitution between the ‘integrated’ asset and the other ‘external’ assets 
(more precisely whether the substitution effect is higher than the marginal 
productivity of the ‘integrated’ agent with his asset). These results are 
summarized in Table 1 below, which provides a general characterization for 
                                                 
57 Other allocations are possible but are redundant with those presented. In particular, j giving 
access on ja to i  while keeping veto and access is equivalent to non-integration and j giving 
access on ja to i  while keeping veto and renouncing to access is equivalent to j  giving veto 
to i  (i.e. joint ownership).  
58 Should we say that the fourth is delusive? 
the optimal allocation of rights (we simplify notation by writing jajSE  for 
, ( , )j
a
S A jMin SE S A )
59. 
 
Allocation of 
rights on ja  to i
,j ka a  
complementary
,j ka a  substitutes 
(1/ )j ja aj i jP p n SE>
,j ka a  substitutes 
(1/ )j ja aj i jP p n SE≤  
 ,i ja a   always 
complementary     
Access Access Ownership 
 ,i ja a     
 complementary  
 but substitutes in 
 presence of ka  
N/A None Veto 
,i ja a  always 
substitutes 
None None Veto 
 
TABLE 1 
 
As we move from left to right of Table 1, the substitutability between ja  and 
ka  increases. Similarly, as we move from bottom to top, the complementarity 
between ia  and ja  increases. The allocation of rights is a function of the 
level of complementarity between ia  and ja  relative to the level of 
substitutability between ja  and ka .  
                                                 
59 Proposition 5 is compatible with Propositions 2 & 4. When all assets are complementary 
(top left corner) j  should give access on ja  to i  (Proposition 2). When all assets are 
substitutes (bottom), j should keep ownership if she is highly productive, but should give veto 
to i  if she has low productivity (Proposition 4). 
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Note that when ,j ka a  are complementary the substitution effect is 
negative (by definition) so the marginal productivity of j  (non negative by 
definition) is higher than the substitution effect. And when ,i ja a  are always 
substitutes they are substitutes in presence of ka . So Table 1 can be 
conveniently reduced to the following table.  
 
Allocation of rights 
 on ja  to i  
j  non LP with ja  j  LP with ja  
 ,i ja a   always 
 complementary           
Access Ownership 
,i ja a   substitutes in   
 presence of ka   
None Veto 
 
TABLE 2 
 
In their framework, H&M focus on a special case: all assets are 
complementary (at the margin). Open access should be the optimal structure 
but it is not within the scope of H&M structures. Nevertheless they find 
specific properties with some additional conditions. Because ,i ja a  are 
always complementary, j  should give access to i . When the 
complementarity between ia  and ja  is ultimate, e.g. when ,i ja a  are strictly 
complementary or when i  is indispensable to ja , both the productivity of j  
alone and the substitution effect (without i ) are equal to zero. So j may as 
well give veto to i . Overall j should give ownership to i  and we get 
Propositions HM6 and HM8 of H&M. 
As an illustration, consider the case of shareholders. Shareholders 
have a financial asset which is complementary to the physical assets of the 
productive agents. They should have outside veto on an asset 1a  if the 
physical asset is substitute at the margin with other assets and if the agent 
who accesses the asset has low productivity. But why shouldn’t the 
shareholders have access on the asset? The explanation is provided by 
Proposition 5. When their financial asset is not always complementary to the 
physical asset in presence of other physical asset(s), shareholders should not 
have access. The intuition is the following. Suppose a shareholder also has 
veto on a second asset 2a  and that the substitution between 1a  and 2a  is 
stronger than the complementarity between 1a  and the financial asset (e.g. if 
1a  does not have a strong need for cash and is competing with 2a  on the 
same market). Then the shareholder’s incentives will be reduced in presence 
of 2a . Moreover the incentives of 2a ’s manager will also be reduced in 
presence of the shareholder. So not giving access to the shareholder prevents 
him to ‘merge’ substitute assets ( 1a  and 2a ).  Overall, access by managers 
and veto by shareholders can be viewed as joint ownership between those two 
parties in order to protect their respective incentives. 
Our model is based on the presumption that ownership encompasses 
both access and veto. Another line of thought would be to consider that veto 
is ownership (ownership is reduced to the right to exclude others from the 
assets). We would then have to reinterpret our results with two main impacts. 
Integration would not be equivalent to ownership of one party’s asset by the 
other (it would require both ownership and access), and ownership would not 
be driven by the complementarity of assets (at the margin) but mainly by 
their substitutability. In both cases the major intuitions brought by H&M 
would have to be re-evaluated. 
 
4. Applications 
 
For simplification and ease of notation we will study a three assets case60. It 
can easily be shown that the following results may be extended to two 
complementary assets substitutes to 2n −  assets or one asset complementary 
to 1n −  substitute assets. With three assets there are four cases: all assets are 
bilaterally complementary (see Proposition 2), bilaterally substitutes (see 
Proposition 4), two complementary assets are each substitutes to the third 
asset, or two substitute assets are each complementary to the third asset. We 
study now the two latter cases. 
                                                 
60 As highlighted by Hicks (1970) ‘one needs at least three factors in order to exhibit the 
character of substitution-complementarity relationships; but three factors is enough’. 
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(a) Two complementary assets substitutes to a third asset 
Applying Proposition 5 to the three agents/assets, we get the results in Table 
3 below.  
 
1 2,a a  
complementary 
and substitutes to 
0a  
2 2
2 2(1/ 2)
a aP SE≤  
1 1
1 1(1/ 2)
a aP SE>   
1 1
1 1(1/ 2)
a aP SE>
2 2
2 2(1/ 2)
a aP SE>
1 1
1 1(1/ 2)
a aP SE≤
2 2
2 2(1/ 2)
a aP SE≤
 1 2,a a  always 
complementary 
T1 integration 
of 2a  
(e.g. acquisition) 
Multiple access 
on 1 2,a a  by 1&2
(e.g. cross 
licensing) 
 1 2,a a  
substitutes  
in presence of 0a
Multiple veto61 
on 2a  by 1 & 2 
(e.g. JV, 
subsidiary) 
Non integration 
(e.g. 
subcontracting) 
Joint ownership 
on 1 2,a a  by 1 & 2
(e.g. merger) 
 
TABLE 3 
 
In transaction cost theory, a firm is created if the cost of transacting within 
the firm is lower than through the market. For H&M62, this corresponds to T1 
integration, and joint ownership is never optimal. In our model, when two 
complementary assets are independently substitutes to an external asset, they 
should be integrated or jointly owned (i.e. constitute a firm) if they are always 
                                                 
61 Multiple veto is equivalent to joint ownership on 2a  by 1  and 2 . 
62 In H&M, 1 2,a a  are always complementary, the substitution effect is non positive (since 
assets are complementary) and joint access is not available. The possible control structures are 
then: T1 integration (when 1 11 13
a aP SE>  and 2 22 23 0a aP SE= = ), non integration (when 
1 1
1 13
a aP SE>  and 2 22 23a aP SE> ), and joint ownership (when 1 11 13 0a aP SE= =  and 
2 2
2 23 0
a aP SE= = ). 
complementary and the productivity of one of the agents is lower than the 
substitution effect of her asset with the external asset63.  
So what is a firm? H&M define a firm as a collection of (complementary) 
physical assets. We precise this notion. If we focus on the assets which are 
owned together, a firm is a collection of assets which are always 
complementary, for which no more than one agent does not have low 
productivity with her asset independently (if the agents are separately highly 
productive with their assets, they should own separate firms). If the group of 
agents has low productivity with the group of assets, there should be outside 
ownership.  
This provides an answer to the question of ‘why do firms own essentially all 
the nonhuman assets it uses in production’ (Holmstrom, 1999). If a firm is a 
collection of always complementary assets, the assets have to be bundled 
together (we will call A  the bundle of 1a  and 2a ) and are not separately 
owned by the (low productivity) agents (otherwise the incentives of any agent 
would be reduced). Suppose that both 1 and 2 had low productivity64 with 
their respective asset. They jointly own A , i.e. none of them can individually 
access or veto A . In this case, not only are the assets clustered, but also the 
agents. The assets A  are not accessed by any individual agent but by a 
collectivity of agents (1 and 2, call it f ). If f  is highly productive with A  
it will own it. If f  has low productivity with A , there will be outside veto: 
the assets A  are accessed by f and vetoed by both f  and outside parties. 
By induction we can extend the process to n  always complementary assets 
and n  agents. Suppose an asset { }1,..., nA a a=  owned by an agent 
{ }1,...,f n=  is always complementary to an asset 1na +  owned by an agent 
'f  the same process will take place and the two firms will merge if one of 
the two firms has low productivity with its asset(s). In this continuous process 
of mergers and acquisitions, low productivity firms are always susceptible to 
be acquired by another firm and look for always complementary assets in 
order to increase their productivity relative to the substitution effect and 
become highly productive. Always complementary assets are clustered 
                                                 
63 To paraphrase Coase, a firm is ‘an island of complementary assets in an ocean of substitute 
assets’. 
64 The same analysis would apply if either one had low productivity. 
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together and are owned by the cluster of agents who bring the assets together 
(plus outside parties if the owners have low productivity)65.  
If we extend the notion of the firm to the assets which are vetoed together 
(rather than owned together), we can remove the first part of our definition: 
assets do not need to be always complementary to be part of the same firm. A 
firm can have veto power on an asset (a JV or subsidiary) which is not always 
complementary (corresponding to multiple veto in Table 3 above).  
- Joint ownership 
When two complementary assets are substitutes with a third asset, joint 
ownership of the two complementary assets is optimal if the marginal 
productivity of each agent with the complementary asset is lower than the 
substitution effect (e.g. if the two assets are strictly complementary).  
- Vertical mergers 
When two activities (performed by separate firms) in the vertical production 
chain are complementary and substitutes to a third firm, from the above they 
should integrate (i.e. acquisition or joint ownership) if the marginal 
productivity of at least one of them with its asset is lower than the 
substitution effect. Otherwise subcontracting or joint access (e.g. cross 
licensing) is the best governance structure. If we interpret the substitution 
effect with the external firm(s) as the (negative) incentive impact of 
transacting through the market, we find here an illustration of the transaction 
cost theory66. The higher the asset specificity (complementarity between the 
two assets), the lower the marginal productivity of the agent with its asset 
alone (at the extreme, when the two assets are strictly complementary, the 
marginal productivity of an agent with its asset alone is equal to zero). When 
the marginal productivity becomes lower than the incentive impact of 
transacting through the market (i.e. the substitution effect), integration 
becomes the best governance structure.  
 
(b) One asset complementary to two substitute assets 
Applying Proposition 5, we find the results summarized in Table 4 below. 
 
                                                 
65 As will be seen later, the notion of assets can be extended to human capital assets and the 
individuals who bring their complementary human capital assets (the employees) are part of 
the firm f .   
66 Williamson (1985, 1996) 
1 2,a a  substitutes 
and complementary 
to 0a  
1 1
1 1(1/ 2)
a aP SE≤  
2 2
2 2(1/ 2)
a aP SE≤  
1 1
1 1(1/ 2)
a aP SE>  
2 2
2 2(1/ 2)
a aP SE>  
  
 1 2,a a  always 
substitutes 
Multiple veto 
on ia by 0 and i 
(e.g. JV) 
Non integration 
(e.g. 
subcontracting) 
 
 1 2,a a  
complementary in 
presence of 0a  
T0 integration  
of ia  
(e.g. acquisition) 
Multiple access  
on ia by 0 and i  
(e.g. franchising) 
Multiple 
access  
on 0a  by 1&2  
 
TABLE 4 
 
The results in Tables 3 and 4 provide a justification and a characterization for 
‘hybrid’ governance structures (Williamson, 1985, 1996). The boundaries of 
the firm are fuzzy. If instead of restricting the firm to the assets which are 
owned (i.e. vetoed and accessed) together, we extend its limits to the assets 
vetoed or accessed, we get a broader definition, encompassing the notion of 
‘hybrid’ governance structure (one where one agent gives access or veto (but 
not both) on her asset to another agent). The above results provide the 
conditions under which hybrid structures (e.g. franchising, licensing,…) may 
be optimal. We analyze franchising as an example. 
- Franchising 
Franchising is a control structure where some agents (the franchisees) own 
substitute assets (their customer base), but each of these assets is 
complementary to the asset of the franchisor (the branded concept). 
Proposition 5 provides a rationale for this control structure, which is optimal 
when (i) the assets of the franchisees become complementary in presence of 
the franchisor’s asset (this is in general enforced by the exclusive territory 
clause in the franchising contract), (ii) the productivity of the franchisees is 
higher than the substitution effect (here also the exclusive territory clause 
may ensure that the substitution effect is kept at a level lower than the 
productivity of each franchisee). 
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- Insurance industry 
Proposition 5 can also help shed some light on the organization of the 
insurance industry. GH comment on the positive observed correlation 
between the existence of ‘independent’ agents and the size of an agent’s 
client acquisition costs. They show that their model predicts that an agent will 
own the client list when the agent’s marginal incentives are relatively 
important in generating contract renewal, which is in line with the observed 
correlation. They also comment on an alternative explanation provided by 
Marvel (1982): an agent will have an exclusive dealing67 with the company 
when it is more efficient for the company to advertise than for the agent. 
Proposition 5 helps to reconcile the two points of view. In a setting with 
substitute agents complementary with the insurance company, it shows that 
when the marginal productivity of the agent is relatively low (i.e. lower than 
the substitution effect) the insurance company should have some control 
rights on the agent’s client list. This is in line with GH’s argument. But in our 
framework the company should have ownership when the agent’s client list is 
complementary to the other agent’s list combined with the insurance 
company’s assets or veto rights (i.e. exclusive dealings) when it is substitute. 
It is plausible that an insurance company which advertises heavily will make 
the ‘brand’ of the contract relatively more important than the personal 
relationship with the agent. Thus an agent’s client list will become more 
substitutable to another agent’s list combined with the company’s name. In 
line with Marvel, it should not be surprising to find that companies with 
exclusive dealings contracts spend more on advertising. 
 
(c) Other applications 
The results of this paper can be used to study many other applications.  
- Capital structure (financial assets) 
Applied to financial assets, our framework may shed light on the capital 
structure puzzle68. Considering that a secured debt contract gives access on 
the assets of the firm to the debt holder (the debt holder uses the assets of the 
firm to generate payment of interests and the borrower renounces to its veto 
                                                 
67 In their critics of Marvel argument, GH argue that an exclusive dealing contract is ‘one 
method of enforcing list ownership rights’.  Exclusive dealing is in fact a veto right given by 
the agent to the insurance company and is thus an alternative to ownership by the later. 
68 Myers (1984).  
power by pledging the assets) and equity gives veto power to the shareholder 
(voting rights), we can directly apply the results of Proposition 5: 
 
Capital structure 
( 0a : external  
financial capital) 
1 1
1 1(1/ 2)
a aP SE≤  1 11 1(1/ 2)a aP SE>  
 1 2,a a  always 
substitutes 
Equity Retained Earnings 
 1 2,a a  
complementary in 
presence of 0a  
Ownership by 0 (Secured) Debt 
 
TABLE 5 
 
The firm will issue debt when its productivity with the asset alone is higher 
than the substitution effect of the investment opportunities and its asset is 
always complementary to the financial asset (i.e. the firm has a high need of 
cash). It will issue equity when the productivity with its asset alone is lower 
than the substitution effect of the investment opportunities and its asset is not 
‘always complementary’ to the financial asset (e.g. the firm has a low need of 
cash). If the firm issues debt but its marginal productivity later becomes 
lower than the substitution effect (e.g. as defined in the covenants), then the 
debt holder will get ownership on the asset69.   
- Employment contract (human capital assets) 
Similarly, we may apply the results of this paper to human capital assets. We 
define human capital assets as having inalienable access, i.e. nobody can use 
agent’s i ’s human capital without her consent (formally, ( ) ii hυ =  and 
( ),ih j jυ∉ ∀ ). Note that this property does not prevent agent i  to give (or 
sell) veto power on her human capital to another agent j  (e.g. the owner of a 
                                                 
69 Hansmann and Kraakman (2002) define a security interest as ‘a contingent claim on an asset 
that permits the holder of the interest to take physical possession of the asset and sell it to a 
third party upon the non-payment of the debt’ and explain that a security interest is a property 
right because it is enforceable against subsequent transferees of rights in the asset. 
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physical asset). In that case i agrees not to use her human capital without j . 
This is our interpretation of an employment contract70.  
Also, following Williamson (1985), we will say that an employment contract 
(or a subcontracting contract) has ‘high power incentives’ if the employee 
(respectively the contractor) receives residual income. In our framework it 
means that the employee has access to the physical asset and can derive 
revenues from it (nobody else can veto her). Directly applying the above 
results we get: 
 
Human capital 
( 0a : physical asset) 
1 1
1 1(1/ 2)
a aP SE≤  1 11 1(1/ 2)a aP SE>  
1 2,h h  always 
substitutes 
Employment contract, 
Low power incentives 
Subcontracting, 
Fixed price 
1 2,h h  complementary 
in 
 presence of 0a  
Employment contract, 
High power 
incentives 
Subcontracting, 
High power 
incentives 
 
TABLE 6 
 
In the debate between Coase and Alchian & Demsetz71 on the nature of the 
employment relationship, H&M propose to reconcile the two positions with 
the concept of ownership. The employer is the owner of the physical assets 
with which the employee works, unlike in the independent contractors 
relationship. Ownership of the physical assets confers authority to the 
employer and therefore the employee is more likely to do what the employer 
wants than in the case of independent contractors. The problem with H&M 
approach is that it does not explain situations where one contractor owns the 
                                                 
70 This definition is similar to Segal (2003). The GHM literature assumes that inalienability 
applies to the control (rather than access) of human capital assets. But their notion of control 
encompasses both veto and access. 
71  Where Coase argues that the difference between an employment relationship and one 
between independent contractors is that the employer can tell an employee what to do, while 
an independent contractor must persuade the other one through prices, Alchian & Demsetz 
believe that both relationships are essentially of the same nature. In both cases the manager 
(resp. customer) can fire the employee (resp. supplier) if he is unhappy. 
physical assets with which the other contractor works (as in the case of a car 
manufacturer owning the dies and stamping machines with which the 
subcontractor will make auto bodies). In that case what is the difference with 
an employment relationship? Proposition 5 provides a new perspective, 
closer to Coase’s argument. The employer has veto rights (i.e. control) on the 
employee’s human capital while this is not the case in the independent 
contractor relationship. In fact an employment contract corresponds to the 
‘vertical integration’ of human assets by the owner of the physical assets72. 
But since, in the absence of slavery, ownership of human assets is prohibited, 
the firm will only acquire veto power (and not access) on the human capital 
assets.  
Therefore, when human capital assets are substitutes, an employment contract 
will be optimal if the physical asset is essential for the agent (or the physical 
asset is strictly complementary to the agent’s human capital), or the owner of 
the physical asset is indispensable to the agent, or the agent is unproductive 
with her human capital alone.  
We can now precise our definition of the firm. A firm is a collection of 
complementary assets (physical and human) vetoed together for which no 
more than one agent is highly productive with one of the assets independently. 
In this definition employees are part of the firm, while subcontractors are not. 
 
Our framework can be applied to a multitude of other applications. In a 
companion paper, we provide justification for many empirical cases (such as 
ownership structure of race teams in Formula 1, internal or external sales 
force, the structure of franchise operations, or the ownership structure of 
gasoline retailing). 
 
5. Concluding remarks 
 
Building on the Property right theory of GHM, this paper proposes a broader 
framework to analyze the effects of incomplete contracts. By de-bundling 
ownership into access and veto rights, we can study a larger class of agents 
(i.e. including agents who have access and no veto and agents who have veto 
and no access) and a larger class of contracts. Allowing for any kind of asset 
                                                 
72 See also Klein (1988) for an interesting discussion on vertical integration and the difference 
between physical capital and human capital. 
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relationships, we can analyze a broader (possibly unlimited) class of real life 
situations. 
 Applying the framework, we find that the relationship between the 
marginal productivity of an agent with an asset and the substitution effect is 
key, and we get a set of interesting (preliminary) results: ownership is not 
always optimal; single ownership, joint ownership, outside ownership, and 
partnerships are all valid forms of optimal control structures based upon 
availability of highly productive agents; integration should occur only when 
assets are always complementary and one agent has ‘low productivity’; 
alternatively the allocation of access or veto is optimal depending on the 
productivity of the agents and the relationship between the assets. We 
propose a definition for the boundaries of the firm: a firm is a collection of 
complementary physical and human capital assets vetoed together for which 
no more than one agent is highly productive with one of the assets 
independently. If the group of agents has low productivity with the group of 
assets, outside parties have veto power. In this definition employees are part 
of the firm, while subcontractors are not. 
Of course, our framework is not immune to the usual limitations of 
this stream of literature. In particular, it is sensible to the solution concept and 
does not extend to nonlinear bargaining solutions, it focuses on the ex-ante 
investments effects and assumes that ex-post bargaining is efficient, and it 
does not consider other (important) complications such as payoffs uncertainty, 
risk aversion, or wealth constraints. We have limited the scope of the model 
by keeping the underinvestment assumption of H&M73. 
But despite these limitations, we believe that its main merit stands out. We 
can now apply the power of the GHM framework to a much larger (possibly 
unlimited) class of situations. In the previous section, we have mentioned 
some of them (hybrid governance structures, human capital assets and 
employment contracts, financial assets and the capital structure), but we can 
think of many others: hierarchy (managers have veto right but not ownership 
on the employees), social capital, intangible assets,…  
Another potential line of research would be to further extend the model and 
incorporate other classes of rights (e.g. alienation right, the right to sell the 
asset and determine who has veto rights), ultimately extending it to the five 
                                                 
73 If this seems reasonable, especially in the case of human capital investment, the possibility 
and impact of overinvestment would deserve to be analyzed. 
categories expressed by Schlager and Ostrom (1992). Also the results 
developed in that paper are linked to the notions of complementarity or 
substitution at the margin and to returns on investment at the margin but 
these are difficult to measure empirically. A promising line of research to test 
the pertinence of our model would be to develop empirical proxies for those 
concepts. 
Overall, we think we have provided (partial) answers to the main 
critiques on the limitations of the property rights theory. Taking the 
ownership of rights over assets as primitives, our framework takes into 
account the complexity of the notions of ownership and residual control 
rights (Demsetz, 1998, Foss and Foss, 2001). It allows integrating the 
Coasian (and GHM) view of the firm, the Berle and Means perspective, and 
the Chandler’s multi-divisional corporate structure (Bolton and Scharfstein, 
1998). It acknowledges that investment incentives are not provided by 
ownership alone (Holmstrom and Roberts, 1998). Finally it provides a more 
precise definition of the firm and may help to clarify why firms or 
shareholders ‘own’ assets rather than individuals and why the assets of the 
firm are clustered (Holmstrom, 1999). Nevertheless much remains to be done 
to fully comprehend the complex internal and external bargaining processes 
that determine the boundaries of the firm. 
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6. Appendix 
 
Proof of Lemma 1. 
We follow the proof of Proposition 1 in H&M. The equilibrium investment is 
characterized by equation (1.4), which, given assumption on human capital 
investment, can be rewritten as 
( )
( , ) 0ex xg x ββ =∇ = , with 
1
( , ) ( ) ( , ( ) ) ( )
n
i i
S i
g x p S v S S x C xβ β
=
≡ | −∑ ∑ .  
(i) Equilibrium investment. 
Consider two control structures β  and βˆ  so that 
ˆ( , ( )) ( , ( )), ,i iv S S v S S i Sβ β≤ ∀ ∀ .  
We have ˆ( , ) ( , ),g x g x xβ β∇ ≤ ∇ ∀ .  
We take ˆ( , ) ( , ) (1 ) ( , )f x g x g xλ λ β λ β≡ + −  for [ ]0,1λ ∈   
and define ( )x λ  to solve ( , ) 0f x λ∇ = . By totally differentiating we get:   
  
1
( , ) ( , )( ) 0
n
i
i i
f x f xdx d
x
λ λλ λλ=
∂∇ ∂∇+ =∂ ∂∑  
ˆ( , ) ( ) [ ( , ) ( , )]H x dx g x g x dλ λ β β λ= − ∇ −∇  
1( ) ˆ( , )[ ( , ) ( , )]dx H x g x g x
d
λ λ β βλ
−= − ∇ −∇  
( , )H x λ  is negative definite (by concavity of v  and convexity of C ) and its 
off-diagonal elements are nonnegative (by assumption on complementarity of 
investments). Thus 1( , )H x λ−  is nonpositive, so ( ) / 0dx dλ λ ≥ . Therefore 
(0) (1)x x≤  and ˆ( ) ( )e ex xβ β≤ . So, if every agent’s marginal return on 
investment increases (decreases) then the equilibrium investment increases 
(decreases). 
Setting ˆβ β=  in the above, it is easy to show that ˆ( ) ( )e ex xβ β≤  and 
ˆ( ) ( )e ex xβ β≤ . Therefore the Nash equilibrium investments are unique. 
Comparing (1.4) to (1.5), and given property (1.3), we have  
( ) ( , ( ) ) ( , ),i i
S i S
p S v S S x v N A x iβ
| ∈
| ≤ | ∀∑  
when assumption A1 holds. Thus ( , ) ( ),g x W x xβ∇ ≤ ∇ ∀ . Applying the 
same reasoning than in (i) and replacing ˆ( , )g x β  by ( )W x , we can show 
that *( )ex xβ ≤ . So when assumption A1 holds, there is always 
underinvestment.  
Finally ( ( )) ( ( )) 0e eW x g xβ β∇ ≥ ∇ = and ˆ( ) ( )e ex xβ β≤ imply that 
ˆ( ( )) ( ( ))e eW x W xβ β≤   by concavity of W . Thus when equilibrium 
investment increases welfare increases. 
 
Proof of Proposition 3. 
(i) Suppose { }( ) ,i ji a aβ = . Take a more exclusive control structure βˆ  
similar to β  except that { }ˆ( ) ii aβ =  (i.e. ˆ( ) ( )S Sβ β⊆ , S∀ ). Then 
ˆ( , ( )) ( , ( ))i iv S S v S Sβ β≥ , S∀   
and ˆ( , ( )) ( , ( ))j jv S S v S Sβ β≥ , S∀ , for j i≠ . The marginal return of each 
agent will not be reduced by the change of control structure. Hence by 
Lemma 2, welfare will be higher under the new control structure βˆ  and by 
Lemma 3 allocating veto increases welfare and is more efficient than 
allocating ownership 
 (ii)  From (i) we get *( ) 1,i iβ ≤ ∀  . By (1.3), ( ) ( )i Sβ β⊆  for all i S∈ , 
therefore ( ) ( )
i S
S iβ β
∈
⊇U . Suppose there exists an optimal control structure 
*β such that * *( ) ( )
i S
S iβ β
∈
⊃U  for some S . Take *S  the smallest S N⊆  
such that 
*
* * *( ) ( )
i S
S iβ β
∈
⊃U  with *( )iβ ≠ ∅  for some i  in *S , and 
consider the following control structure 'β  : 
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{ }
* *
* * *
( )            if  
'( )
( ) \   if  
S S S
S
S a S S
ββ β
 ≠=  =
  with 
*
* * * *( ) \ ( )
i S
a S iβ β
∈
∈ U .  
When *S S⊂ , * *'( ) ( ) ( ) '( )
i S i S
S S i iβ β β β
∈ ∈
= = =U U . When *S S= , 
{ }
* *
* * * * *'( ) ( ) \ ( ) '( )
i S i S
S S a i iβ β β β
∈ ∈
= = =U U  (by definition of *a ). Hence 
'( ) '( )
i S
S iβ β
∈
=U  for all *S S⊆  and *'( ) ( )S Sβ β=  for all *S S⊄ . 
Thus 'β  satisfies (1.3) (since *β  satisfies (1.3)) and 
*'( ) ( ),S S S Nβ β⊆ ∀ ⊆ ( *'( ) ( )S Sβ β=  for *S S≠  and 
* * *'( ) ( )S Sβ β⊂ ). 'β  is more exclusive than *β . Since assets are 
substitutes at the margin, *( , '( )) ( , ( )),i iv S S v S S Sβ β≥ ∀  (since 
* *( ) 1Sβ > ). Thus the marginal return of each agent will not be reduced by 
the change of control structure and by Lemma 2, welfare will be higher under 
the new control structure 'β . So *β is not an optimal structure which 
contradicts our assumption and it must be that * *( ) ( )
i S
S iβ β
∈
=U . 
Hence, in an optimal control structure, * *( ) ( )
i S
S iβ β
∈
=U  if some 
*( )iβ ≠ ∅ . If *( ) ,i i Sβ = ∅ ∀ ∈ , then * *( ) ( )
i S
S iβ β
∈
⊇U . 
 
-Proof of Lemma 3. 
(i) We compare a control structure β  to a control structure 'β  identical to 
β , except that now agent i  controls a  ( ( )a iβ∈ ). The impact of change for 
i  is : 
{ } { }
{ }
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( )[ ( , ( ) ) ( , ( ))] ( )[ ( , ( ) ) ( , ( ))]
( )[ ( , ) ( , )] ( )[ ( , ( )) ( , ( ) )]
i i i i
i S i SS SS S
i i i i
i S i SS SS S
p S v S S a v S S p S v S S a v S S
p S v S a v S p S v S S v S S a
β β
β β
β β β β
β β
∈ ∈=∅ ≠∅
∈ ∈=∅ ≠∅
∪ − + ∪ −
= − ∅ − − ∪
∑ ∑
∑ ∑
 
which is { },(1/ )[ ( , ) ( , )] [ ( , ) ( , )]i i i iS An v i a v i Max v S A v S A a≥ − ∅ − − ∪ , i.e. 
non negative if i  is highly productive with a  . 
This is also 
{ },[ ( , ) ( , )] (1/ ) [ ( , ) ( , )]i i i iS Av N a v N n Min v S A v S A a≤ − ∅ − − ∪ , i.e. non 
positive if i  has low productivity with a .  
Hence control by a highly productive agent increases her incentives and 
control by a low productivity agent decreases her incentives. 
For an agent j i≠ , the impact of change is 
{ }
,
( )[ ( , ( ) ) ( , ( ))]j j
S j i S
p S v S S a v S Sβ β
∈
∪ −∑ , which is equal to zero if 
j controls a  and non negative if j  does not control any asset and is highly 
productive with a .  
 (ii) We suppose that two agents i  and j  are identical (i.e. 
{ } { } { } { }( , ( )) ( , ( )), , ,k kv S i S i v S j S j k i j Sβ β∪ ∪ ≡ ∪ ∪ ∀ ≠ ∀ ), except 
that i  is highly productive with an asset a  while j  has low productivity 
with a . We compare a control structure β  where j  controls a  to a control 
structure 'β  where i  controls a .  From the above 'β  is more efficient for 
i  . The impact of change for j  is: 
{ }
( ) ( )
( )[ ( , ) ( , )] ( )[ ( , ( ) \ ) ( , ( ))]j j j j
j S j S
S i S S i S
S S
p S v S v S a p S v S S a v S S
β β
β β
∈ ∈∉ ∉=∅ ≠∅
∅ − + −∑ ∑
 
which is 0≥ since j  has low productivity with a . The impact for an agent 
,k i j≠  is: 
{ } { }
, ,
( )[ ( , ( ) \ ) ( , ( ))] ( )[ ( , ( ) ) ( , ( ))]k k k k
k j S k i SS Si S j S
p S v S S a v S S p S v S S a v S Sβ β β β
∈ ∈∉ ∉
− + ∪ −∑ ∑  
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The first term is non negative but the second term is non positive. We 
compare the first part of the first summation (1) to the second part of the 
second summation (2) and the first part of the second summation (3) to the 
second part of the first summation (4). It is easy to see that (1) (2)≡  and that 
(3) (4)≡  since i  and j  are identical. 
Hence, control over an asset by a highly productive agent is more efficient 
than by a low productivity agent. 
Therefore low productivity agents will control an asset only if there is no 
highly productivity agent with the asset who does not control any asset 
(otherwise it would be more efficient to give her control over the asset).  
 
 - Proof of Proposition 4 
(i) Suppose ( )j aυ = . We compare a control structure β  where  j  does not 
veto a  to a control structure 'β where she does. The impact of change is 
equal to zero for j  and for i j≠  is 
{ } { }
{ }
( ) ( )
( )[ ( , ) ( , )] ( )[ ( , ( ) \ ) ( , ( ))]i i i i
i S i S
j S j S
S a a S
p S v S a v S p S v S S a v S S
β β
β β
∈ ∈∉ ∉
= ⊂
− − ∅ + −∑ ∑
  
which is non negative if i  controls other asset(s) or if no other agent than j  
accesses a . Note that if j  is indispensable, then allocating veto to her is 
neutral. 
So, allocating veto on an asset a  to an agent j  who accesses it will increase 
welfare if no other agent accesses a . A direct consequence is that if there is 
only one highly productive agent who accesses an asset she should also veto 
it. 
(ii) But if other agents who have access to the asset are highly productive in 
her absence, the agent should not veto it (the impact of change in the above 
expression is non positive for i ). Suppose aS  is the set of highly productive 
agents who can access a . Then no agent in aS  should individually veto a . 
Also any agent outside of aS  should not have veto on a , since it would 
reduce the marginal returns of the (highly productive) agents in aS . Should 
all agents in aS  jointly veto a ? Compare a control structure β  where no 
one can veto a  ( ( ),a i iχ∉ ∀ ) to a control structure 'β where all agents in 
aS  have joint veto on a  ( ( ) , , ( )a aj j S S aχ χ= ∅ ∀ ∈ = ). For aj S∈ , the 
impact of change is zero (no agent can veto him). For ak S∉ , the impact  
is { }( )[ ( , ( ) \ ) ( , ( ))]
a
k k
k SS S S
p S v S S a v S Sβ β
∈
∩ =∅
−∑ , which is equal to zero 
since no agent outside of aS  has access to a . 
Thus joint veto on a  by all agents in aS  is equivalent to no veto and is 
efficient.  
(iii) Should a low productivity agent access an asset already accessed by 
another agent? We compare a control structure β  where an agent i  and a 
low productivity agent j  access an asset a  to a control structure 'β  where 
only i  accesses a . The impact is equal to zero for i  and for j  is 
{ }( )[ ( , ( ) \ ) ( , ( ))]j j
j SS i S
p S v S S a v S Sβ β
∈∉
−∑ ,  
which is 0≥  ( j  has low productivity).  
For ,k i j≠  the impact { }
,
( )[ ( , ( ) \ ) ( , ( ))]k k
k j SS i S
p S v S S a v S Sβ β
∈∉
−∑ is 
0≥ if k  controls another asset or k  does not control any asset and has low 
productivity with a . So for any other agent ,k i j≠  the impact of change is 
non negative. 
A low productivity agent should not access an asset already accessed by 
another agent. 
Incidentally, it can also be shown that if the first agent is indispensable, 
giving access on an asset to a second agent is neutral (i.e. does not increase 
welfare). 
(iv) Suppose a  is accessed by one agent i ( ( )i aυ = ) who has low 
productivity with a . Should someone else have veto on a ? Compare a 
control structure β  where  j i≠  does not veto a  to a control structure 
'β where she does. The impact is zero for j and for i  is 
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{ } { }
{ }
( ) ( )
( )[ ( , ) ( , )] ( )[ ( , ( ) \ ) ( , ( ))]i i i i
i S i S
j S j S
S a S a
p S v S a v S p S v S S a v S S
β β
β β
∈ ∈∉ ∉
= ⊃
− − ∅ + −∑ ∑ , 
which is 0≥  since i  has low productivity with a . For ,k i j≠  the impact of 
change is { }
,
( ) ( , ( ) \ ) ( , ( ))k k
k i S
j S
p S v S S a v S Sβ β
∈∉
−∑ , which is 0≥ if k  
controls an asset other than a  or k  does not control any asset and has low 
productivity with a . 
Outside veto on a  is efficient when the agent who accesses an asset has low 
productivity. 
Note that no condition is attached to j . In particular j  could be an outside 
party. 
(v) An asset not accessed by any individual agent could be accessed by a 
group of agents ( aS ) (joint access). Comparing a control structure β  where 
no agent can veto a  ( ( ),a i iχ∉ ∀ ) to a control structure 'β  where all 
agents in aS  have joint veto on a  ( ( ) , , ( )a aj j S S aχ χ= ∅ ∀ ∈ = ), the 
difference in marginal return is equal to zero for ai S∈ , and is 
{ }( )[ ( , ( ) \ ) ( , ( ))]
a
j j
j SS S S
p S v S S a v S Sβ β
∈
∩ =∅
−∑  for aj S∉ , which is also 
equal to zero since ( )a Sβ∉  when aS S∩ =∅  (no agent outside of aS  
can access a ). Thus joint veto by aS  is equivalent to no veto. 
What about individual veto by each of the members of aS ? Comparing a 
control structure β  where the productive agents of aS  can individually veto 
a  ( ( ) , ai a i Sχ = ∀ ∈ ) to a control structure 'β where the agents of aS  have 
joint veto on a  ( ( )aS aχ = ), the impact of change for ai S∈  
is ( )[ ( , ( )) ( , ( ))]
a
i i
i SS S S
p S v S S v S Sβ β
∈
⊄
−∑   which is equal to zero ( S  cannot 
control a  in both cases since some agents of aS  are not in S ). For 
aj S∉ the impact is ( )[ ( , ( )) ( , ( ))]
a
j j
j SS S S
p S v S S v S Sβ β
∈
⊄
−∑ , also equal to 
zero. 
When agents of aS  have joint access, joint veto by aS  is equivalent to 
individual veto by each member of aS  and to ‘no veto’. The agents of 
aS have joint ownership on the asset.  
In addition, if aS  has low productivity with a , outside veto will increase 
welfare by (iv). 
 
Proof of Proposition 5. 
The initial control (ownership) structure where each agent owns an asset is 
named NIβ  (no integration) and ( )NI ii aβ = , ( )NI jj aβ = , ( )NI kk aβ = . 
(i) When should j  give access on ja  to i ? We compare the marginal returns 
on investment between joint access (when j  give access on ja  to i ) and 
non integration. The impact is zero for j . For  i  it is 
{ }( )[ ( , ( ) ) ( , ( ))]i iNI j NI
i SS j S
p S v S S a v S Sβ β
∈∉
∪ −∑ , i.e. 0≥  if ja  is (always) 
complementary to ia  in absence of j . For k  it is { }
,
( )[ ( , ( ) ) ( , ( ))]k kNI j NI
k i SS j S
p S v S S a v S Sβ β
∈∉
∪ −∑  which is 0≥  when ja  is 
complementary to ,i ka a  in absence if j  (which is always true if ,i ja a  are 
always complementary). 
Hence, giving access on ja  to i  will increase welfare when ,i ja a  are 
(always) complementary in absence of j . 
(ii) When should j  give veto on ja  to i ? Compare the marginal returns on 
investment between multiple veto (when j  gives veto on ja  to i ) and non 
integration. The impact of change is equal to zero for i . For j  it is 
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{ }( )[ ( , ( ) \ ) ( , ( ))]j jNI j NI
j SS i S
p S v S S a v S Sβ β
∈∉
−∑ , i.e. 0≥  when j  has low 
productivity with ja  in absence of i . The impact for k  is 
{ }
,
( )[ ( , ( ) \ ) ( , ( ))]k kNI j NI
k j SS i S
p S v S S a v S Sβ β
∈∉
−∑  which is 0≥  when 
,j ka a  are substitutes in absence of i   
Overall, giving veto on ja  to i  will increase welfare, when ,j ka a  are 
substitutes in absence of i  and ia  and the productivity of j  with ja  is lower 
than the substitution effect of ja  in absence of i . 
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